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Abstract
There exists no satisfactory theory of risk in current normative
decision theories. Notions based on utility curvature, loss aversion
and probability weighting are derivative, cannot be applied to non-
numerical consequences, and are not psychologically intuitive. I
develop Pure Risk theory which resolves these problems – it is
consistent with existing normative theories, and both internalises
and generalises the intuitive notion of risk being related to the
probability of not achieving one’s aspirations. The theory shows
that existing models are misspeci…ed. E¤ects hitherto modelled as
loss aversion or utility curvature may be due instead to Pure Risk.
Keywords: Risk; Pure Risk; Aspiration Levels; Subjective Ex-
pected Utility Theory; Prospect Theory; Pure Risk Prospect Theory.
JEL Classi…cation: D81
Rethinking Risk: Aspiration as Pure Risk
Greg B Davies1
1 Risky Goals
When faced with a choice between acts in a risky world, what
goals should be rationally used to guide one’s choice of act?
One intuitively plausible answer, and one that is given almost
axiomatic status by the …nancial world, is that the decision maker
should seek to maximise the expected bene…t and to minimise the
inherent risk of the decision. However, the precise content of what
constitutes appropriate concepts of “bene…t” and “risk” is by no
means unproblematic. The vast majority of research on rational
decision making in the past half-century has focussed heavily on the
…rst of these potential goals, characterising “bene…t” as the utility of
the potential outcomes of the decision taken. What then of risk? The
rather surprising answer given by the axiomatisations of Expected
Utility Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) and Subjective
Expected Utility (Savage 1954) is that, given any preference ordering
of acts (leading to risky, uncertain, or certain outcomes) that meets
the rather minimal requirements of the axioms, a utility value may
be ascribed to each possible consequence in such a way that the
preference ordering of acts is fully replicated by the expected utility
ordering of these acts.
So, if any preference ordering may be fully re‡ected in the
expected utilities attached to the consequences, then it must be the
case that these utilities already re‡ect any attitudes to risk that
may be held by the decision maker. In maximising expected utility,
the risk concerns of the decision maker are already accounted for.
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Subjective Expected Utility
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(SEU) Theory tell us that the utility allocation required to represent
a given preference ordering over acts is unique up to an a¢ne
transformation, but it does not tell us anything about the way in
which the utilities required to represent this preference ordering are
a¤ected by attitudes to risk versus return. Where risk is discussed
in the context of EUT it is purely in the context of the way in which
utility values might be attached to numerical (usually monetary)
outcomes. I shall argue in this article that these concepts of risk
do not, in fact, represent true risk attitudes but rather merely the
in‡uences of unrelated psychophysical factors that have an incidental
e¤ect on risk attitude. What is missing is a theory of risk that is
both psychologically intuitive and that provides an explanation for
the way in which risk attitudes a¤ect preference orderings. This
paper will attempt to provide such a theory.
Risk has had precise formulations within EUT, SEU and their
later variants (of which Quiggin’s Rank-Dependent Utility (1982)
and Tversky and Kahneman’s Cumulative Prospect Theory (1992)
stand out as current candidates to render EUT more descriptively
valid). In the more sophisticated versions of these theories risk
attitude may arise from three potentially distinct components. The
…rst two relate to the way in which utility is attached to monetary
outcomes, …rstly in terms of the concavity or convexity of the value
function (which may be di¤erent for gain and loss outcomes in
reference dependent models), and secondly from loss aversion, the
degree to which individuals react more strongly to losses rather than
gains. The third component is found in Rank Dependent Utility
(RDU) models and arises from the way in which decision makers
transform probabilities by giving more or less weight to extreme
outcomes in a lottery.
There are, however, at least three problems with these versions
of risk. Firstly, they do not have an intuitive psychological inter-
pretation: in particular they do not seem to adequately characterise
what we intuitively mean when we refer to the riskiness of a decision.
There is no real sense in which SEU seeks to minimise risk and, if
risk in any sense is minimised by a decision maker employing SEU, it
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will only be insofar as the interaction of the three components result
in that individual attributing to the gamble a certainty equivalent
that is less than the expected value of the gamble. This may be
guaranteed, for example, in the situation where the decision maker
has a value function that is globally concave and does not transform
probabilities. However, this concavity is not implied by SEU, but is
rather a descriptive assertion which places limitations on the theory.
This assertion may be justi…ed in a number of ways, the most ob-
vious being that, if SEU is used as the theory of risky choice, then
empirical observation suggests that people are risk-averse and must
have a concave value function. However, there is nothing in SEU that
states that this need be the case - individuals may be risk-seeking as
well as risk averse, and indeed may have value functions that have
segments of both convexity and concavity. I would argue, however,
that if we think introspectively about what the “risk” of a decision
intuitively means to us, then we …nd that it is not an ambivalent
concept which one may plausibly seek to maximise or minimise de-
pending on preferences, but rather that risk is, in a deep sense, a
negative concept, something that a coherent concept of rationality
should mandate that we minimise. That is, minimising risk in some
sense is a fundamental goal of instrumental rationality.
The second problem with existing concepts of risk is that, aside
from risk attitude due to rank dependent decision weights, they are
reliant either on a value function that transforms monetary values
to utilities. If the value function is concave, the individual can be
shown to be risk averse with respect to the underlying monetary
outcomes. Any concept of risk that relies on transformation through
such a function cannot be applied in its absence. Hence, there is no
way that the standard concepts of risk based on the value function
(through curvature or loss aversion) can be applied directly to a
preference ordering between acts if the consequences of these acts
cannot be entirely described be some underlying numerical scale.
To say that risk only has meaning as a concept insofar as there
is a function to translate numerical monetary outcomes to utility
seems extremely narrow and restricts risk only to decision problems
3
where the consequences can all by fully described on some prior
numerical scale. The consequences related to the acts do not have
to be speci…ed as monetary outcomes in Savage’s (1954) axiomatic
treatment and one can certainly imagine that changing risk attitudes
could change the structure of a preference ordering in such cases,
without requiring that the consequences be fully described on a
monetary scale.
A third problem relating to the historical association between risk
and the curvature of the utility function is that, because some of
the e¤ects of a curved value function may be given interpretations in
terms of risk, this has led to a confusion between psychophysical and
psychological reactions to monetary amounts on the one hand, and
risk attitudes themselves on the other. In a broader context, the fact
that the three components mentioned above all induce some degree
of risk attitude in that the a¤ect the certainty equivalent value of a
gamble does not imply that they are the sum total of what we mean
by risk. These three factors certainly in‡uence risk attitude, but this
does not imply that they jointly constitute risk attitude. In fact, I
shall argue that some concept of risk may and should be given pride
of place as a fundamental concept governing the way in which utilities
are attached to outcomes, and that this concept is independent of
psychophysical and psychological reactions to numerical or monetary
amounts as well as to subjective probability. This novel and distinct
source of risk attitude I shall term our attitudes to Pure Risk (PR).
Whilst reactions to value, which will be discussed in detail below,
may be said to in‡uence decisions in a manner that resembles the
functioning of risk attitude, they are not themselves PR attitude. If
nothing else, these concepts apply equally in situations of certainty
as they do under uncertainty.
The primary problem with this oversight is that it has led to
the assumption that risk may be adequately characterised through
the use of a value function (and possibly, in the case of rank-
dependent utility theories, through the additional e¤ects imparted
by a nonlinear decision weighting function) and that attaining an
adequate theory of risk is simply a matter of getting the form
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and parameterisation of this function correct. The failure of these
value functions to adequately describe empirical or introspective risk
attitudes is a result of trying to get one function to do the work of
two - one governing psychological and psychophysical reactions to
values, and the second governing attitudes to PR. That the three
components of the standard approach in combination lead to some
measure of risk aversion has resulted in the resumption of any quest
for a theory of PR itself.
This paper will provide a theory of risk that may applied to any
uncertainty or variability in possible future outcomes following a
choice of act rather than solely to transformations of a numerical
scale to utilities, or probabilities to decision weights. Since I
intend this theory to represent risk in its pure sense and not be
derived incidentally from other e¤ects, I term the notion PR. An
attitude to PR may be held by a decision maker regardless of her
value function curvature or degree of rank-dependent probability
distortion, although these concepts may have an additional e¤ect
on the Total Risk Attitude in that they in‡uence the individual’s
certainty equivalence for a given gamble.
It is worth noting from the outset that SEU and its later derivative
theories have been increasingly under …re as descriptive theories
and, whilst RDU Theories have been successful at describing actual
choices of binary prospects, they appear to be unable to predict
choices accurately when the prospects become more complex, i.e.,
in exactly the choice contexts where one would expect to see risk
becoming an important determinant of choice (see Birnbaum 1999,
Luce 2000, Payne 2004).
In what follows I will …rst present and discuss concepts of risk
that are found in standard SEU and in its more advanced derivative
theories, particularly CPT and variations thereon. If SEU is valid as
the normative criterion of choice, then we already have some concept
of risk embedded in current theories when applied to monetary
outcomes. It will be important for the development of a theory of
risk as a fundamental factor in rational choice to understand what
is, and is not, accomplished by these alternative concepts of risk.
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It is important to emphasise that I am not suggesting that SEU
is incorrect as a normative theory of risky choice, but that it does
not contain a complete theory of how the appropriate SUE utility
allocation is in‡uenced by risk. For this it is necessary to describe
how PR attitudes a¤ect our preference ordering between acts in a
risky environment. After discussing the SEU embedded concepts of
risk I will move on to the development of the normative theory of risk
itself, and its implications for the standard normative framework.
2 Traditional Notions of Risk
Through long, and frequently sloppy, use of the term “risk” in both
theoretical and practical applications we are left with a plethora
of alternative de…nitions, concepts, and measures, all masquerading
under the name of Risk. Many of these do not warrant discussion
here as they are either practical measures that proxy for some
unspeci…ed concept of risk (e.g., many …nancial risk measures such
as downside volatility, VaR, etc.), or they will not be confused with
the uses I will employ in our current discussion. However, there are
a number of concepts of risk embedded in the standard discussions
of SEU (although these do not have to follow from the framework
of SEU itself), and it is essential to understand why these di¤er
from PR and how they can be justi…ed within a broader theory
that introduces PR explicitly as a basic notion. Before discussing
these, however, there is one further meaning of risk that needs
to be clari…ed, that of the Knightian distinction between decision
making under uncertainty, and decision making under risk. The
latter refers to a decision environment where numerical probabilities
may be assigned to the possible states of the world, the former
to an environment where this is not the case. PR theory may be
incorporated into either situation and when referring to standard
model of expected utility maximisation I mean this to refer broadly
to theories compatible with Savage’s (1954) Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) where the preference ordering is formed in a situation
of uncertainty.
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2.1 Risk Attitude Through the Value Function
2.1.1 Perceptual Risk
Let us now examine the concepts of risk that are embedded in the
standard criteria of rational decision making under risk. The ‡avour
of risk that is most central to EUT is that due to the curvature
of the value function - where the function is concave the decision
maker is “risk averse”, whilst “risk-seeking” behaviour results from
a convex function. Due to the long use of the terms risk-aversion
and risk-seeking within the theory of expected utility maximisation,
they have almost become synonymous with concavity and convexity
respectively. It is important, therefore, for us to enquire in precisely
what sense concavity justi…es the use of the term “risk aversion”,
and to ask how this …ts with our intuitive concepts of “risk”. That
is, what precisely is the nature of the risk to which one is averse if
one possesses a concave value function.
The concavity of the value function may be associated with the
notion of certainty equivalence. Given any act with risky outcomes,
we may specify an act with no risk (i.e., the same outcome in every
state of the world) for which the decision maker is indi¤erent between
the two. If the utility function is concave the value of the certain
outcome of the second act will be lower than the expected outcome
of the …rst. That is, an individual with a concave function will be
prepared to accept lower expected value in order to eliminate the
uncertainty inherent in the risky act. A corollary to this is that a
decision maker with a concave function will always prefer the act with
a single certain outcome to any other act with the same expected
value. The greater the concavity, the lower the certainty equivalence
of any act - the more expected value the decision maker will sacri…ce
to attain an equal level of expected utility. The reverse is true of a
convex value function.
There are two broad ‡avours of models with di¤erent implications
for how utility is assigned to money. The standard version of SEU
assumes that utility is derived from absolute monetary amounts.
That is, from total wealth where utility increases monotonically
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with wealth. The risk attitude inherent in the traditional version
of SEU arises because people attribute utility to absolute monetary
values in a non-linear way. The standard assumption is that people
attribute utility to wealth at a decreasing rate. Thus, greater wealth
leads to greater utility, but a given additional increment of wealth
provides less utility to the wealthy than to the poor. This results in a
concave value function for which, through the application of Jensen’s
inequality, E [u (x)] · u (E [x]) (which is a de…ning property of a
concave function and states that the expected utility of a prospect
is less than the utility of the expected value of the prospect), we
see that an individual with concave utility will always prefer the
prospect with the certain outcome equal to the expected value of
the risky prospect, to the gamble itself. This notion of risk is tightly
bound to the way in which values are transformed psychologically
into utility, that is, the way that humans perceive values on some
scale (monetary or otherwise). Because of this link I shall refer to
this concept of risk as absolute perceptual risk.
Note that, whilst the reasonable assumption of diminishing
marginal utility with wealth leads automatically to risk aversion,
it is by no means a necessary consequence of the theory. An
individual could transform monetary wealth in such a way as to
have a convex utility function, in which case maximising expected
utility would result in choosing increased risk in this sense. The
Weber-Fechner law in the psychology of perception, however, does
give us both theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that
we would face diminishing sensitivity to many scales, including
monetary scales. Introspection too o¤ers clear guidance here. It
would seem pathological for an individual to value an additional
£10 more if he were already a millionaire than if he were living in
poverty.
The other, more recent, perspective on utility transformations
holds rather that it is changes in wealth that are the carriers of utility
- utility is measured in terms of changes in wealth from a reference
point and for any decision can be negative as well as positive2.
2A further distinction often debated by economists is whether utility should be derived
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This latter approach was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky’s
Prospect Theory of 1979. It appears to …t far better with empirical
evidence of actual choices people make - faced with a risky prospect,
people seem to treat the outcomes as gains and losses relative to a
reference point.
This use of a reference point leads to the possibility of a
di¤erence between transforming numerical gains to utility values,
and transforming numerical losses. People seem to psychologically
perceive losses quite di¤erently from gains. The extensive empirical
research on gain and loss utility functions most commonly …nds that
people make choices as though they were using a concave function
for gains, and a convex function for losses (for example Tversky and
Kahneman 1992). Thus, if people attribute utility to changes in
wealth rather than to absolute levels of wealth then they display
risk aversion for gains, and risk seeking behaviour for losses3. Again,
this pattern is not a consequence of the theory, but arises from
other theoretical and empirical considerations. Cognitive psychology
predicts this pattern by invoking diminishing sensitivity to stimuli
relative to the reference point. If what people notice is gains and
losses relative to some status quo, then we would expect them to
be less able to distinguish a given increment the further it is from
the reference point. An extra £1 added to a loss of £1 million will
be less noticeable than £1 added to a loss of £5. This provides
a psychophysical explanation for the common pattern we actually
observe although this may not be the whole story. This concept of
risk I shall term reference dependent perceptual risk.
More recent theories are attempting to combine these two per-
spectives by, for example, using changes in wealth as the carriers of
from wealth or from consumption. Either choice can be reconciled with both the relative
and absolute versions of EUT. Consumption may seem the more natural choice, with the
relative version being deviations of consumption from some reference level. However,
wealth can be interpreted as the means to a ‡ow of consumption and whilst there are
distinctions to be made here, as long as the utility from wealth is monotonically related
to that from consumption, they will not be of great concern for our discussion here.
3I should point out that non-parametric investigations of reference dependent utility
functions show a great deal of individual variation, but risk aversion for gains, and
risk seeking for losses seems to describe both the representative agent, and the median
individual (Abdellaoui 2000). Most work on reference dependent utility also employs
rank-dependence which may result in more complex patterns of risk attitude.
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utility, but allowing the assessment of these gains and losses (i.e., the
transformation of the values to utilities) to change as overall wealth
changes (e.g., see Schmidt 2003, Sugden 2003). Thus the function
is de…ned over gains and losses, but the precise shape of this func-
tion will be partly wealth dependent. Both perspectives have some
intuitive appeal and may both play a role in the transformation of
numerical values to utility for any given person.
Regardless of which of these two perspectives is adopted, there
is no sense in which either resulting concept of risk is something
to be minimised. Where the functions result in risk aversion
due to a concave transformation this is largely attributable to the
psychophysics of value, rather than to any intuitive notion of risk.
Risk as a concept in traditional SEU models is entirely derivative on
value perception - it is an accidental result of the theory rather than
an important concept of rationality in its own right.
2.1.2 Loss Aversion
The move to reference dependent utility led to the introduction of
a further concept that captures some of what we might consider to
be naturally part of a comprehensive notion of risk. It intuitively
seems that risk should have more to do with the chance of things
going badly, than of things going well, a notion referred to by
Fishburn (1982) as “the conventional notion that risk is a chance
of something bad happening”. It has long been noticed that losses
are psychologically more important than gains, and empirical studies
have shown that people do indeed treat losses di¤erently from gains,
and that this di¤erence is deeper than simply di¤erent curvatures on
the relevant portions of the value function (though see Schmidt and
Traub 2002 for recent experimental work challenging the universality
of loss aversion). Decision makers will generally weight potential
losses more strongly than gains of the same magnitude. This leads
to a type of risk embedded in reference dependent EUT that does
recognise risk as a negative and focuses on the downside: the concept
of Loss Aversion.
Loss aversion can be incorporated into reference dependent utility
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theory by decomposing the function into a loss aversion index, and
a basic perceptual transformation. This is represented as:
V (x) =
½
v (x) if x ¸ 0
¸v (x) if x < 0
¸ is a loss aversion index capturing the exchange rate between
gains and losses. If people are loss averse then ¸ > 1 and V
is steeper in the loss domain. As Köbberling and Wakker (2003)
point out, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assume that v (x) = x®
for gains and v (x) = ¡ (¡x)¯ for losses. With this formulation
v (1) = ¡v (¡1) = 1, which implies a scaling convention such that
¸ = ¡V (¡1)V (1) . This convention is not independent of the unit of
payment, so they suggest an alternative convention of ¸ =
¡V 0"(0)
V 0#(0)
where V 0" (0) is left derivative at 0, and V 0# (0) the right. This imposes
an assumption of smoothness on the basic perceptual transformation
function v (x) which is thus not directly a¤ected by the shift from
gains to losses. Thus, the e¤ect of loss aversion on risk attitude is
completely separated from the transformation of monetary outcomes
into basic values.
To show that loss aversion can be precisely disentangled from
utility transformations as separate components of risk aversion Köb-
berling and Wakker utilise Yaari’s (1969) de…nition of comparative
risk aversion which is framed in terms of acceptance sets. The accep-
tance set of sure outcome x is the set of all prospects that the agent
prefers to receiving the amount x with certainty. Yaari proposed
that if the acceptance set of agent 2 is contained in the acceptance
set of agent 1, then agent 2 is more risk averse. In other words agent
1 will be prepared to take all the gambles that agent 2 is prepared to
take, plus some gamble or gambles that agent 2 is not prepared to
take. This de…nition is a powerful tool as it allows us to characterise
an individual as more (or less) risk averse than another, without
having to specify a precise de…nition for risk. It may be applied to
decision theories to determine the characterisation of risk aversion
within that theory. Applied to SEU Yaari’s de…nition characterises
concave value functions, as expected. In theories where risk aversion
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may result from more than one component Yaari’s de…nition is less
useful as it does not separate the components. For example an agent
may have greater risk aversion than another due to perceptual risk,
but less loss aversion. Examining the case where one acceptance set
is contained in another requires that both components work in the
same direction and thus may be di¢cult to separate.
Köbberling and Wakker examine loss aversion by looking at two
agents who have identical acceptance sets for gains only prospects
and for loss only prospects4, but where agent 2’s acceptance set is
contained with agent 1’s set for mixed prospects. This precisely
characterises loss aversion: it is observed only in mixed prospects
and relates to exchange rate of gain and loss utility. Because their
acceptance sets are identical for gains only and loss only prospects,
risk attitude in this case cannot be due to the way basic values are
attributed to monetary outcomes. However, since agent 2 does have
an acceptance set that is contained within agent 1’s set, there is an
element of risk aversion. This must therefore be due to the way
losses are treated relative to gains.
Because loss aversion is a component of the value function, of the
way in which utility is assigned to numerical values, it is subject to
the same critiques as the other concepts of risk found in EUT (or
its variants). In particular the risk attitude due to loss aversion is
concept that is derivative on psychological reactions to losses versus
gains, rather than being due to any fundamental notion of risk. In
addition it is subject to the problem of non-numerical outcomes
which I discuss next. Nonetheless, it is evident that Loss Aversion
encapsulates an element of the notion of risk that cannot be captured
by the traditional measures involving perceptual curvature.
2.1.3 The Problem of Non-Numerical Outcomes
The risk attitude that arises from standard SEU is a direct conse-
quence of how the individual assigns utility to numerical outcomes.
It resides in the transformation of monetary outcomes to utility val-
4And identical decision weighting functions, a further component of risk attitude that
will be discussed in the next section.
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ues. One problem with this is that the concept only has any traction
if the outcomes themselves can be numerically described. If the out-
comes in di¤erent states of the world can only be verbally described
then it is not clear in what sense the transformation of these out-
comes to utility values can be said to be concave or convex. This
is not a problem of uncertainty rather than risk in the Knightian
sense. If we can assign both probabilities and utilities to outcomes,
but cannot also describe the outcomes themselves by numerical val-
ues, then there is no way in which maximising expected utility has
anything meaningful to say about risk. This framework may tell us
which act will be preferred, but not why this should be due in any
way to risk attitude.
To illustrate this problem consider the example below which has
been borrowed from Savage (1954). Assume you have just entered a
room where a friend has been making an omelette, and has already
broken 5 good eggs into a bowl. You o¤er to …nish making the
omelette and must now decide what to do with the sixth egg which
must either be used or will be wasted. The egg is in one of two
unknown states: good, or rotten. In a simple framing of this
problem, which will su¢ce to illustrate my point, you have three
possible acts to choose between: either to throw the egg away, to
break in directly into the bowl of 5 good eggs, or to break it into a
saucer to check whether or not it is rotten before adding it to the
other eggs. The possible consequences are illustrated in the table
below.
State
Act Good Bad
Break into bowl six-egg omelette no, omelette, and
…ve good eggs de-
stroyed
Break into saucer six-egg omelette, and
a saucer to wash
…ve-egg omelette,
and a saucer to wash
Throw away …ve-egg omelette,
and one good egg
destroyed
…ve-egg omelette
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According to Subjective Expected Utility Theory, as long as your
preferences between the three acts obey the appropriate axioms, then
there exists an allocation of utilities to each of these consequences
such that your subjective expected utility of the acts maintains the
preference ordering.
However, there is no way in which two individuals may be said to
be more, or less, risk averse than the other according to the standard
description of risk as the curvature of the value function. This is
simply because the consequences do not consist of values that may
be translated into utilities through a function - the utilities that
maintain the preference ordering over acts are allocated directly to
the verbal descriptions without the need to convert these descriptions
into monetary or numerical values …rst. The standard theories of
risk cannot be used in any decision situation such as this where
the decision problem cannot be completely described on a single
numerical scale.
In general we may have a number of possible acts Ai, and
states of the world sj, for each combination of which there is some
consequence cij, which can be any verbal (or even non-verbal in the
case of emotive or a¤ective responses to consequences) description
of the outcome associated with that combination . If the preference
ordering over Ai obeys the requisite axioms then we may allocate a
number uij to each cij such that Ai % Ai0 implies Ej [uij ] ¸ Ej
£
ui0j
¤
for all i0 6= i, where the expectation Ej [¢] is taken over the subjective
assessment of the probabilities of the states of the world sj. Only
if all consequences cij can be completely described by a single
numerical scale, say xij 2 R, can we have the situation where the
utilities uij may be the result of a numerical transformation of the
form uij = v (xij) which may have the properties of convexity or
concavity.
This may appear not to be a problem for the vast range of issues
to which this concept of risk aversion is used (…nance, gambling,
economics, etc.) because it may be argued that in these cases we
have a clear numerical scale with which to describe the outcomes,
that of monetary value. This may be approximately true for large
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subsets of these problems. However, for it to be exactly true that
risk aversion in this sense is meaningful it must be the case that
the outcomes are completely described by their monetary value.
It is by no means certain that this can ever be the case. As an
example consider that a complete description of a future outcome
must necessarily incorporate the decision itself. To describe the
outcome in a particular future state of the world as, for example,
“The decision maker receives £X” is incomplete. Completeness
requires at a minimum a description such as: “The decision maker
receives £X having chosen act A”. To receive £X after having chosen
some other act is a di¤erent state of the world, and may well be
assigned a di¤erent utility. Even if there is no other possible act
that results in the decision maker receiving £X, the fact that it was
act A that was chosen is still a part of the description of the resulting
state.
Further evidence for the impossibility of purely numerical out-
come descriptions comes from the theory of mental accounting. Thaler
(1999) speaks of money as having “labels” in peoples’ minds. Money
is not treated as being completely fungible in decision making, but
is rather labelled according to its sources (regular income, bonus,
windfall, etc.) and its earmarked uses (housing, leisure, etc.). Thus,
even money cannot be described solely by a numerical value in deci-
sion making, but also incorporates descriptive labels that mean that
£1 from one source may be treated quite di¤erently to £1 from an-
other source. In behavioural game theory (see Camerer 2003) too,
it has been repeatedly shown that people imbue monetary amounts
with descriptive components that re‡ect aspects of the “fairness” of
the situation that resulted in the monetary outcome, of the previ-
ous strategic choices of the other player, or of many other aspects
of social preference, all of which may be seen as giving descriptive
labels to purely monetary outcomes. For example, for a child to
receive £x as Christmas gift from a relative may be evaluated quite
di¤erently depending on whether her siblings received the same as
her, or received more than her. It thus seems that it is not possible
to have purely numerical descriptions - it could still be the case that
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an identical utility value is assigned to another outcome in which
the decision maker receives $Y 6= $X after choosing a di¤erent act.
The risk aversion generally associated with SEU then, is, at best, a
partial concept.
I do not wish by means of this argument to imply that risk
aversion due to concave utility is a useless concept, just that it
can only apply to that portion of the utility assignments that is
derived from a numerical value attached to each outcome (and these
numerical values need not necessarily be monetary outcomes, other
numerical scales, e.g., environmental temperature, quantity of food,
or acoustic volume, might also lend themselves to this concept of risk
aversion). This portion is never 100%, although in certain decision
tasks the extent to which the link between numerically valued
outcomes and utility outcomes is in‡uenced by additional verbal
(or perhaps non-verbal but nonetheless non-numerical) descriptions
may be slight.
What are we to make of a concept of risk that only exists when
the utilities assigned to outcomes are transformations of some other
numerical scale? It would seem that, when faced with a choice in
which every possible end-state (in the complete sense) is associated
with a utility value, we should be able to say something about the
riskiness of the acts available to us without having to examine the
numerical provenance of those utilities. Consider a simple decision
problem with three equally probable states of the world
s1 s2 s3 Expected Utility
A1 100 100 100 100
A2 80 100 120 100
A3 60 100 140 100
but imagine that these …nal utility …gures are all we have available
and have not arisen by transforming monetary values through a
utility function - the outcomes in the di¤erent states of the world
may be described but, like the outcomes in Savage’s omelette
example, are not amenable to direct numerical comparisons. SEU
tells us that there exists an assignment of utilities for any complete
preference ordering that obeys the continuity and independence
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axioms, regardless of the whether the consequences may be described
numerically. Using a concept of risk that is dependent on the
curvature of the utility function there is nothing we can say about
the risk inherent in these options.
Economics often implicitly side-steps this problem by assuming
that some monetary value can be attributed to virtually any
descriptive component of an outcome. In the example where the
decision taken is itself a component of the outcome description this
would involve adjusting any actual monetary outcomes by some
monetisation of the “act utility”. This seems to be going backwards
though: why should we require both a utility scale and a monetary
assignment to have a coherent theory of risk. Indeed if we know
the utility allocations to individual outcomes that maintain the
preference ordering, and we assume a speci…c shape for the value
function it is possible to go backwards to the money amounts that
would need to be assigned to the non-monetary outcomes. In doing
this however, we are inferring an additional monetary description
that is unnecessary to ensure an expected utility representation.
Worse still, we have assumed that risk attitudes are solely of the
type embedded in the form we have assumed for the value function,
and that nothing is lost in the move from the full descriptions cij
to the necessary monetary descriptions xij. I claim that all we have
achieved by this move is to stipulate what the monetary equivalent of
the outcomes would be after taking into account our psychophysical
attitudes to money. That these attitudes can a¤ect our certainty
equivalents (and thus overall risk attitude) does not imply that
the monetary equivalents incorporate all there is to say about risk
attitude.
The concept of risk inherent in utility curvature is merely a
consequence of the way utility relates to the numerically measurable
component of the descriptions of outcomes, and is in no way a
universally applicable de…nition of what “risk” actually is. It may
be applied with varying degrees of success to any decisions that have
some numerically measurable component of all of their outcomes
(such as gambling). However, even here there are di¢culties. There
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may be more than one component of the outcome descriptions that
can be numerically measurable. Think of an environmental decision
problem where di¤erent investment packages (acts) lead to di¤erent
possible levels of global wealth and overall levels of global warming.
Avoiding the all too easy economic assumption that the global wealth
levels can simply be adjusted by some amount to re‡ect the e¤ect
of the global temperature levels, we are now left with two numerical
components in this problem. There are thus separate measures of
risk aversion that deal with wealth and temperature, and therefore
two di¤erent concepts of risk. And yet, since by SEU we are
theoretically justi…ed in attributing a single utility level to these
consequences, could we not also hope for a single, universal concept
of risk that is related to the outcome descriptions themselves?
I have argued that, although existing concepts of risk attitude
have no traction in decision problems with non-numerical outcomes,
it is nonetheless meaningful to speak of risk attitude in some more
general sense in analysis of these problems. It may be argued here
that perhaps the numerical transformations are indeed all there
is to risk attitude and that risk attitude has no bearing on non-
numerically described problems. To this argument I would counter
that it certainly seems to be meaningful to speak of acts that are
more or less risky, even where the outcomes cannot be reduced to
a numerical scale. Since each of the acts results in outcomes that
are di¤erent depending on the realised state, it would seem that
some notion of risk must play a role in the rational decision making
process. In Savage’s omelette, for example, it seems to be meaningful
to claim that breaking the egg straight into the bowl is in some sense
riskier that …rst breaking it into a saucer to see if it is good. If such
comparisons of possible acts are meaningful, then there must exist
some notion of risk attitude that does not rely on the psychophysics
of value.
The existence of this attitude to PR may be made more formally
by revisiting Yaari’s (1969) de…nition of risk attitude. His acceptance
sets do not rely on any particular theory of risk and may be applied
to acts with non-numerically described outcomes. It is perfectly
18
intelligible in the omelette example to de…ne some certain outcome
and ask what, for a given individual, is the set of acts that would
be preferred to this outcome. The chosen outcome need not be
one of the set of available outcomes in the decision problem, and
could be numerical or non-numerical. Intuitively it would appear
that breaking the egg straight into the bowl is in some sense more
risky than the other two alternatives. If this is the case it should be
possible to pick some certain outcome such that this outcome will be
preferred to breaking the egg straight into the bowl, but not preferred
to the other two available acts (which thus constitute the acceptance
set of this individual in this circumstance). Another individual may
be said to be less risk averse if her acceptance set, relative to the same
certain outcome, contained all three risky acts. Hence, since we can
coherently describe what it means to have di¤erent degrees of risk
aversion in a situation where the standard theories of risk attitude are
useless to us, it must be the case that there is more to risk attitude
than is contained within these traditional approaches. That is, there
exists a concept of PR that is distinct from the standard theories.
2.2 Probabilistic Risk
There is one further source of risk in SEU derived models. The failure
of SEU to adequately describe observed choice behaviour led to
the development of rank dependent utility (RDU) models (Quiggin
1982). Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT) incorporates RDU into a reference dependent context.
These models allow for decision makers to distort the probabilities
associated with outcomes. In particular, the weight associated
with a particular outcome is no longer determined purely by the
(objective or subjective) probability of it occurring, but also by
the ranking of that outcome amongst all possible outcomes. The
psychological intuition behind this probability distortion is the
Principle of Attention - the attention of the decision maker is
naturally drawn to the best outcomes and the worst outcomes,
leading to these extreme outcomes being overweighted in the decision
process. Lopes (1987) discussed the psychological bases for these
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e¤ects in terms of hope and fear : hope for good outcomes leads to
increased attention to the best possible outcomes, whereas fear of a
bad outcome leads to overemphasis of particularly bad outcomes.
Incorporating these decision weights into SEU requires a trans-
formation of the cumulative probability distributions for losses, and
the decumulative distribution for gains. For this transformation to
meet the conditions imposed by the principal of attention, the func-
tion needs to be inverse-S shaped (that is, concave near 0 and convex
near 1). Empirical evidence suggests that there is a great deal of vari-
ation between individuals, but that the median decision weighting
function is indeed inverse-S shaped (Abdellaoui 2000, Luce 2000).
If people do distort probabilities in this way the distortion will af-
fect the certainty equivalent value, and it forms a further source of
observed risk attitude.
The transformation of probabilities results in the decision being
made as if the decider were using the undistorted probabilities of
an alternative distribution, the Imputed Distribution (Davies and
Satchell 2004a) and can result in a change in the certainty equivalent
value and hence in the risk premium of the prospect (see Davies and
Satchell 2004b for a discussion of the e¤ects of risk types on the risk
premium in CPT). With an inverse-S shaped weighting function,
the e¤ect of rank-dependent probability weightings on the overall
certainty equivalent is indeterminate. The tendency to focus on the
worst outcomes will lead to an increase in risk aversion and hence
in the risk premium, whereas the distortion due to hope will reduce
risk aversion. In CPT the relative magnitude of these two factors
will also be a¤ected by the position of the reference point, relative
to the ranked outcomes.
Although this component of risk aversion does not require
a transformation from consequences that can be fully described
by a single numerical scale as for the perceptual risk and loss
aversion components, like them it is also completely derivative on
a psychological intuition that is not intended to be a theory of risk
itself. The principle of attention that leads to inverse-S shaped
decision weighting functions draws attention to both the extreme
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gains and extreme losses of a distribution. In addition, a loss of
a given amount may have its weighting increased in one prospect,
whilst decreased in another prospect. This concept appears to relate
far more to the perception of individual outcomes relative to the set
of outcomes with which it is presented, and to the salience of extreme
members of a set of consequences than it does to any fundamental
notion of risk. Again, we have a concept that may incidentally
in‡uence the risk attitude of a subject for a particular decision, but
is not itself part of the PR attitude of the subject.
CPT and RDU models have in recent years taken an empirical
pounding from the experimental evidence amassed by Michael
Birnbaum (e.g., 1998, 1999, 2004) that unearths a number of new
choice paradoxes that violate CPT. As alternatives he o¤ers a more
general class of “con…gural weight models” of which RDU and CPT
are special cases, but which all cause decision weights to be distorted
from the underlying subjective probabilities. Other members of the
class cause distortions which, though di¤erent from those predicted
by RDU, would also function as a source of probabilistic risk. Thus,
whilst these models might provide descriptively better predictions of
choice behaviour, they do not get us closer to a true theory of risk.
3 The Need for a Theory of Pure Risk
To summarise the classical position then, within the SEU or RDU
framework risk attitude arises from a number of di¤erent e¤ects.
Firstly from the Perceptual Risk associated with attaching basic
utility to numerical outcomes. This can be either absolute perceptual
risk, or reference dependent perceptual risk for which the curvature
of the basic utility function may a¤ect risk attitude separately
for gains and losses. Secondly, from Loss Aversion resulting from
the disparity in psychological attitudes to gains and losses. The
third component is due to the distortion of probabilities implied by
attention being subconsciously drawn to extreme outcomes.
Of more importance here, however, is the fact that all three
of these classes of risk attitude are entirely derivative concepts.
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The …rst two only have traction insofar as there is an underlying
numerical scale which can be transformed into utility and they do
not encapsulate our intuition of what is meant by risk. They arise
entirely as a side e¤ect of human psychophysical or psychological
perceptions of value and gains versus losses, rather than from any
notion of risk as a speci…c entity to be minimised. Although these
concepts have been at the centre of vast amounts of research on
risk aversion, their connection with PR is incidental. The existence
of these derivative risk measures has had the deleterious e¤ect
that we have not noticed that the maximisation of expected utility
is insu¢cient to characterise precisely how utility is allocated to
particular outcomes, and that what is lacking is, in fact, a theory of
PR.
Before moving on I should …rst like to digress brie‡y on why we
should want a normative theory of risk that ful…lls this role. After
all, given that we can only ever observe the preference ordering of the
true individual imbued with an attitude towards risk which therefore
masks the role played by PR attitudes themselves, the notion is
purely conceptual. The …rst response is that it would seem desirable
to have some theory of what it is that we mean by the term “risk”, an
understanding of which might allow us to approach the problem of
rational choice under uncertainty more thoroughly. That the theory
I o¤er is satisfactory in such a sense is an evaluation that will have
to follow the exposition of the theory below.
As a second answer, we should ask ourselves what it is about the
structure of the acts in the decision problem above that makes the
theory of expected utility such an important concept. In a risk free
decision problem we only have need of a simple criterion to ensure our
goals are best accommodated in the act chosen: chose the act with
the best (certain) consequence. This is simply a matter of ranking
certain outcomes by their preference. Once we introduce risk to the
structure of the problem our analogue of that simple goal fails to
adequately resolve the choice problem - the outcomes are no longer
certain and we require a theory that indicates how we should weigh
up the various outcomes and the uncertainty associated with each.
22
We should therefore suspect that, since what we have added to the
problem is risk, some fundamental concept of risk attitude might be
required to adequately describe the rational choice. Indeed, as Lola
Lopes says of EUT in her 1987 article on the psychology of risk,
“after all the study and all the clever theorizing, we are left with a
theory of risk taking that fails to mention risk.”
Re‡ect for a moment on the superordinate goal of the decision
problem. Given our structure of beliefs, desires, needs, wants, etc.,
we ascribe utility to the outcomes associated with various possible
future states of the world. Our overall goal with relation to the choice
we face is to achieve maximum ex post utility. In a risky environment
achieving that goal is not directly accessible to us because part of the
determination of the …nal outcome is out of our control. However,
even though we cannot act to achieve maximal ex post utility directly,
it still remains the optimal ex post resolution of the problem. The
translation of this goal in our risky environment is “to maximise
achieved (i.e., ex post) utility given the acts that are available”. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern demonstrated that the utilities can be
allocated in such a way that picking the act, or one of the acts, with
the maximal expected utility is the best way of choosing in the sense
that it maintains our preference ordering over acts, given our beliefs
and desires. However, the unsatisfactory part of this theory is that,
although it provides the solution to the problem of choosing the
optimal act when we move to a choice environment that embodies
risk, there is no explanation within the theory of the role played by
risk attitude in the allocation of appropriate utility values.
For a third reason recall that SEU says that there exists a utility
allocation to all consequences in a decision framework such that
the preference ordering over acts is maintained by the (subjective)
expected utilities of the acts. If the axioms leading to RDU hold then
there exists both a utility allocation to consequences and a mapping
from subjective probabilities to decision weights, and the preference
ordering in this case is maintained by the expected utility where the
subjective probabilities are replaced by the rank-dependent decision
weights. Because the two models are di¤erent we should expect the
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utility allocation to be di¤erent depending on whether preferences
obey the axiomatic structure leading to SEU, or to RDU. In neither
case, however, does the model tell us how to allocate these utilities
to consequences, just that a suitable allocation exists. Traditional
value functions are attempts to …ll this gap, to provide a method for
allocating utilities to consequences where the consequences may be
completely described numerically. This method does not start from
the preference ordering and ask what utilities need to be assigned to
maintain the preference ordering through the criterion of expected
utility. Instead it begins directly with monetary consequences and
postulates that the utility function is of a speci…c form, the choice
of which is guided by theoretical and empirical considerations. This
approach is essential if SEU is to be at all useful: if one cannot
somehow assign utilities directly to consequences in such a way as
to be con…dent that they are the “correct” utilities in the sense that
they will maintain the preference ordering over acts, then one is left
with a theory with no predictive content. Assigning utilities directly
to consequences enables one to examine choices without having to
observe the entire preference ordering of the decision maker.
How, though, are we to be sure that the value functions that
are standardly used are, in fact, assigning the correct utilities to
consequences? This is at least partially an empirical question. If
using a given function enables us to perfectly predict choices in every
case, then we can be reasonably sure that this method of attaching
utility numbers to consequences is arriving at the “correct” utilities
that maintain the preference ordering over acts. Even if this is case,
however, we can never be entirely sure of the correctness of the value
function. In any observed choice we can only observe the top ranked
act. The preference ordering of non-chosen options is never revealed.
SEU shows that there exists a utility allocation that maintains the
entire preference ordering but we can never be entirely sure that our
chosen allocation methodology achieves this. Since the usefulness of
the theory relies on us not having to observe the entire preference
ordering, it becomes important how we choose to assign utilities to
outcomes.
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In the more common scenario where the observed choices are not
entirely predicted by the SEU or RDU model when employing a
given value function then there is a real problem of determining
whether or not it is a misspeci…ed function that is to blame. Failure
to predict choices accurately could arise from a number of factors.
Firstly, as previously discussed the value function is only useful when
transforming numerical scales to utilities - the failure to predict
choices using such a utility function could re‡ect the failure of the
monetary inputs into the utility function to provide a comprehensive
description of the consequences. There may be aspects of the
decision outcomes that are lost in the reduction of the descriptions
to purely monetary outcomes. Secondly, there may be aspects of the
decision environment that cause the decision maker to violate some
of the axioms underlying SEU or RDU. That is, the decision maker
may not be “rational” in the sense required by the theory being
applied. Thirdly the decision maker may be subject to random
errors when making decisions such that observed choices can only
ever be modelled to a certain degree of accuracy. Lastly, the value
function used may itself be a poor model of how consequences may
be assigned utilities in the manner required by the theory, either
because some other functional form is more accurate, or because the
some component is missing entirely.
For many years it was the case that value functions were assumed
to relate to absolute wealth levels. With the advent of Prospect
Theory it was observed that choices seem to be modelled better by
using reference dependent utility which incorporates loss aversion.
It may be the case that some combination of these two perspectives
is correct, or that further re…nements will be proposed that improve
the …t of choice models to actual choices. Given this (probably
not exhaustive) list of possible ways for observed choices to deviate
from predicted choices we have little hope of determining empirically
whether any particular function for attaching utility numbers to
consequences is, in fact, taking us the full distance to the correct
utilities that the theories tell us exist. We thus rely on other means
to motivate the type of value function we choose. The psychological
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principle that we appear to react to changes from the status quo
provides a rationale for reference dependent functions. The principle
of diminishing sensitivity to changes from this reference point may be
used to postulate that this function should be concave for gains, and
convex for losses. Observed attitudes to gains and losses motivates
the use of a parameter governing loss aversion. But once we have
applied all these intuitions through some function v (x), we still
have no way of really knowing whether the transformed values v are
the same as the utilities u which maintain the complete preference
ordering over acts. We have transformed the monetary values using a
mix of psychological intuitions and empirical research in an attempt
to arrive at the utilities required by SEU, but have no reason to
believe that we have arrived at our destination other than by the
brute force strategy of trying to parameterise the chosen utility
function to …t available choice data, which is itself only a glimpse at
the peak of the preference ordering as a whole.
Based on existing concepts of risk that are grounded within SEU
or RDU models, there are, I believe, sound theoretical reasons
for believing that traditionally utilised value functions cannot be
su¢cient to take us from consequences to utilities. If we believe
that decisions are (and should be) in‡uenced by attitudes to some
form of PR, then existing concepts of risk are severely lacking: they
apply only to numerical descriptions of outcomes and they are not
about fundamental attitudes to risk. Thus if attitudes to some
primary description of PR are meaningful, they are not captured
through existing methods of allocating utilities to outcomes. These
traditional functions (which I shall denote by v (x) and may be
reference dependent or not, and may display loss aversion or not)
may tell us how individuals react psychologically to consequences
when described numerically, but ignore PR attitudes and thus, as
long as attitudes to PR in‡uence preference orderings, v (x) cannot
be taken to fully describe the utilities required by the preference
ordering, u. This is shown schematically in Figure 1. In moving
from cij to uij there remain two gaps. One between cij and xij
which re‡ects that portion of the consequence description that is
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lost in requiring numerical scales to which v (x) can be applied.
As discussed above this gap could be formed in part through the
application of mental accounting labels” to monetary outcomes, to
strategic components of the decision, or to social preferences which
are not re‡ected in the straight monetary outcomes. There may also
may many other aspects of the decision of which we are unaware that
require further descriptive labels, due to the e¤ects of framing or of
general a¤ective or emotional responses to the decision environment.
The second gap is between v (xij) and uij which partially re‡ects
the fact that PR attitudes are not in any way incorporated into the
function v (x), and partially the fact that there may be additional
components that in‡uence preference orderings of which we are
currently unaware, or that there may be psychophysical components
missing in our best current theory of how individuals transform
value, i.e., missing elements of v (x).
In trying to model choices between acts using v (x), all previous
attempts to …t value functions to choice data have implicitly tried to
force a particular speci…cation for v (x) to do all the work of moving
from cij to uij . If a theory of PR does have a place in decision
making then previous parameterisations of speci…c forms for v (x)
have been misspeci…ed as they have been trying to …t attitudes to
PR as well as loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. Given this, it
is perhaps more surprising how well such models have performed in
…tting observed choices. Does this not cast doubt on the importance
of some primary concept of PR attitudes in decision making? For
instance in RDU models it is the combination of the value function
v (x) and the decision weighting function that are together involved
in getting from cij to uij, whilst also transforming the probability
distribution. The weighting function may be replaced by some other
of the class of generic con…gural weight models, which are combined
with the value function. These models have proved far more able to
describe observed choice behaviour than SEU models, and yet they
too ignore risk attitudes and cannot be applied to non-numerical
consequence descriptions. Is an intuitive sense of PR then only an
illusion?
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That RDU …ts choice data reasonably well, however, does
not eliminate the space for a theory of PR. Because the many
components built into these models have an in‡uence on total risk
attitude (they may all a¤ect the certainty equivalent value of a
gamble, for instance) it is not too surprising that, when forced to,
they might pick up a considerable amount of that portion of risk
attitude that should properly be attributed to PR. As I will show
later once I have fully speci…ed the theory of PR, it is possible that
by ignoring it we have been forcing loss aversion, value function
curvature and probability distortion to take on values that do not
re‡ect the actual role of these factors in decision making. Thus,
concavity for gains and loss aversion may be exaggerated, whilst
convexity of money attitudes for losses appears lower than it actually
would be were PR attitude taken into account.
If there is a theory of PR attitude that …lls the role I have
described, then any attribution of utilities to outcomes, monetary
or otherwise, that ignores this role of risk is inherently misspeci…ed
and any predictions or models based on this incomplete model will
be incorrect. Since the existing utility functions that are commonly
used do not refer to PR attitude they will not enable us to determine
the preference ordering for any individual except for that idealised
individual that is neutral with respect to PR. It is important,
therefore, that we specify our theory of PR attitude and test its
validity in actual choices.
I have indicated that PR is something to be avoided. Whilst I
do not wish to exclude a priori the possibility that decision makers
might prefer PR, we might ask why risk should a priori be something
that we wish to minimise. After all the standard concepts of risk
in SEU allow individuals to be risk-averse or risk-seeking. The
discussion above provides an answer to this question: the risk we
wish to include as our rational criterion of choice is the risk of not
maximising achieved utility given the options available to us - the
probabilistic risk of not getting as close to our superordinate goal as
possible. Seen in this context risk is uncontroversially something that
a rational being would wish to minimise. As I shall argue in a later
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section this, I believe, corresponds to our intuitive, psychological
conception of risk as a negative concept.
Further anecdotal evidence of why a concept of risk, in particular,
should be an important consideration when analysing choices comes
from the …nancial world where theories of rational decision making
are applied to problems as an everyday tool. As far back as 1952 A.
D. Roy writing on asset selection in Econometrica acknowledged that
practical decision making was as much concerned with minimising
risk as with maximising utility:
Decisions taken in practice are less concerned with
whether a little more of this or that will yield the largest
net increase in satisfaction than with avoiding known rocks
of uncertain position, or with deploying forces so that, if
there is an ambush round the next corner, total disaster is
avoided.
The analogue to maximising expected utility in the …nancial
world is generally the maximisation of expected return (the “value
function” of a …rm is frequently deemed to be linear in monetary
return). However, expected return is normally maximised on a risk
adjusted basis, or is maximised per unit of risk. If the concept of
risk inherent in SEU was all that was relevant to decision making,
then there would be no need for further adjustment. Using expected
return divided by the standard deviation of returns (the commonly
used Sharpe ratio introduced in 1966) can be justi…ed in SEU with
certain restrictive assumptions on the shape of the utility curve or on
the outcome distributions. However, even in this case there has been
a recognition that standard deviation is an unsatisfactory proxy for
our intuitive conception of risk and there has been a move towards
downside measures of risk such as downside volatility and Value at
Risk (VaR). As will become clear, the concept of VaR has a similar,
though more simplistic, structure to my proposed normative measure
of PR.
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4 Pure Risk
So how do we …nd a place for a theory of Pure Risk within the
powerful framework provided by some version of expected utility
maximisation? If an attitude to PR exists, then it must be
incorporated into any given rational preference ordering over possible
acts, or gambles, %. Given a coherent theory of PR it is also
intelligible to examine what it means to be una¤ected by an attitude
to PR, or to be PR neutral. My approach here is to postulate a
hypothetical, but related preference ordering, %N , that is neutral
with regard to PR. That is %N would be the ordering over the
same acts that would be held by the same individual were she
absolutely indi¤erent to risk in this new, and yet to be speci…ed, pure
sense. This separates % into a PR neutral component and a second
component that embodies only attitude the individual’s attitudes to
PR. This second component may be seen as an ordering over acts,
%PR, that describes preferences that are informed solely by attitudes
to PR. We assume that the original preference ordering obeys the
axioms required by SEU (or indeed RDU or CPT as desired) and thus
develop a version of PR theory consistent with which ever of these
theories one prefers. In what follows I shall assume that the original
preference ordering % admits an SEU representation for simplicity.
That is, the preference ordering over acts is such that there exists
a mapping from consequences cij (which need not be numerical
descriptions) to utilities uij 2 R such that the preference ordering is
maintained by the subjective expectation of utility for each act. The
restriction to SUE, however, is not necessary for the development of
PR theory and I shall comment throughout on the e¤ects that would
be expected by the move to RDU or CPT. In a rank dependent
model maintaining the preference ordering would also require a non-
linear transformation of the subjective probabilities and reference
dependence would require that the utilities were allocated relative
to some status quo outcome which would be accorded a utility value
of zero. This preference decomposition is shown schematically in
Figure 2.
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As discussed above PR attitude does not, by de…nition, re‡ect
responses to monetary amounts, attitudes to gain vs. losses, or
subjective probabilities. Thus, when the overall preference order
is decomposed into %PR and %N all these behavioural components
of risk attitude are accounted for by the PR neutral preferences %N.
To the extent that these preferences are reference dependent, or rank
dependent then, this will be preserved in the PR neutral preference
ordering. Although I do not assume here that the PR preferences
are rational in the sense that they don’t violate any of the basic
axioms of SEU, it will later be clear that this must be the case given
the structure of PR attitude. However, it will be necessary for the
development of the theory that %N admits a utility representation.
For reason reason it must be the case that the PR neutral preference
ordering of an individual whose natural preference ordering is fully
rational is also rational. %N must obey the same axioms as %.
If this is the case there thus exists an attribution of utilities to
consequences that is unique up to an a¢ne transformation that
preserves this PR neutral preference ordering. That is, denoting
the PR free utilities as uN (¢) for any gambles f and g, it is the
case that f %N g if and only if uN (f) ¸ uN (g). This contrasts
with the original utilities, u (¢) which re‡ect the full preference
order such that f % g if and only if u (f ) ¸ u (g). Unless the
decision maker is originally neutral with regard to PR, the ordering
%N will be di¤erent from %. It is in the gap between these two
preference orderings that we …nd a place for our theory of PR
attitude. A PR theory is thus required to explain, in a plausible
way, both theoretically and intuitively, how %N is derived from %,
and vice versa, or equivalently, how the utilities u are related to
the PR neutral utilities uN . Note that nowhere will this theory of
risk be required to have recourse to transformations from monetary
values into utilities. Both PR neutral preferences and the original
preferences are de…ned solely on a preference ordering over acts. The
consequences that will be realised on the resolution of uncertainty
following these acts may, or may not, be fully described in terms of
numerical values.
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To give a simple example of the two utilities assume that the
utilities for an individual of a set of acts Ai, given preference ordering
%, are attached to consequences in equally possible states of the
world. sj, by the following values:
s1 s2 s3 E [ui]
A1 100 100 100 100
A2 89 100 110 99:7
A3 78 100 118 98:6
When the PR neutral preferences of the same individual are
considered the attributions of utility will be required to maintain the
preference ordering %N will be di¤erent from those which maintain
%. An illustrative allocation might be:
s1 s2 s3 E
£
uNi
¤
A1 100 100 100 100
A2 80 100 120 100
A3 60 100 140 100
Here, where the individual has a clear preference between the
three acts, the PR neutral preferences are indi¤erent to which act is
chosen. The presence of PR attitude in an individual will alter the
preference ordering that would have been observed in an individual
who did not care in any sense about PR. In this case the upper
utility table has been derived from the …rst by using a simple concave
transformation of the lower table. This re‡ects the fact that the
individual is assumed to be averse to PR and will thus weight the
downward deviation from the middle outcome more than the upward
deviation. This transformation has been chosen arbitrarily at this
point to illustrate the di¤erence between the two utility attributions.
Without a theory of PR we can at this point say nothing yet about
how the two utilities are related. PR theory will provide such a
link between the utilities required to render the preference ordering
for a PR neutral individual and those for a normal individual who
displays PR aversion. It will show how risk may be considered to
have meaning as a natural concept within the framework of expected
utility maximisation without resorting to consequences described in
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purely monetary terms. In doing so it will also discern PR attitude
from existing concepts of risk attitude which are entirely derivative
on psychological or psychophysical responses to monetary values and
to subjective probability distributions.
To specify a theory of PR we need to ask how the addition of
PR attitude to %N will transform the PR neutral utility allocations
uN to the comprehensive utility allocations u. That is, were an
“individual” embodying only PR attitudes to face a decision between
the possible acts, where the consequences already represent all PR
neutral preferences, on what basis would this PR decision be made?
We thus imagine a situation where the preference ordering %PR is
required to make a decision between the Ai where the consequences
cij have been amended to incorporate all non-PR aspects of the
choice. The consequences are thus given by uNij . PR attitude resides
in the translation from uNij to uij .
Describing the place for a theory of PR as I have above has made
use of a few assumptions that I feel it best to make explicit before
attempting to outline the theory itself, which will be developed
within the framework provided by these assumptions. Firstly, I
have assumed that there is a natural, intuitively plausible concept
of PR that is entirely di¤erent from derived concepts of risk that
arise from psychological or psychophysical reactions to money (or
other numerical scales) or subjective probability. These concepts
of risk are assumed not to capture any element of PR so that the
components of Total Risk Attitude that arise from PR aversion may
be entirely separated from those that arise through derivative e¤ects.
This assumption of the existence of PR is an obvious requirement to
formulate a theory of PR - if a PR attitude does not exist then %
and %N will be identical.
Secondly, I have assumed that it is a meaningful concept to
describe an individual that is neutral with regard to PR. Thus,
the preference ordering %N embodies no PR attitude, regardless
of what other psychological attitudes it may incorporate. These
two assumptions may be combined to assume that a PR neutral
preference ordering may be formed from any original preference
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ordering % so that the two di¤er precisely and only with regard
to PR attitude. That is, no other aspects that a¤ect preference have
been tampered with in moving from % to %N .
Lastly comes a set of assumptions such that the %, and %N admit
a utility representation in the sense that they all obey at least some
minimal set of choice axioms su¢cient to ensure a representation. In
the case of the overall preference ordering this is uncontroversial as
I wish this to be a normative theory that applies within the rational
framework as speci…ed by some pre-existing normative model of
decision making (EUT, SEU, RDU, CPT, GDU, etc.). It will turn
out that the structure of PR ensures that %PR also satis…es the
axioms of SEU, which is perhaps a desideratum of a normative theory
of risk preference, but this need not be assumed.
Assumption: There exists a normative and psychologically
plausible attitude towards risk that is not derivative on the curvature
of perceptual transformations of numerical outcomes, loss aversion,
or rank-dependent distortions of subjective probability. This risk
attitude is termed Pure Risk attitude.
Assumption: Given a complete, well-behaved preference order-
ing between acts, %, that admits a utility representation (possibly
with the addition of con…gural decision weights), we may decompose
% into two components %PR and %N. %PR embodies solely and
completely the PR attitude of the individual. %N embodies all other
aspects of the rational preference ordering and is neutral with regard
to PR.
Assumption: %, and %N admit utility representations. %N thus
permits an allocation of PR neutral utilities uN to all consequences
which are di¤erent to the overall utilities u that preserve %, unless
% is also PR neutral. If % also has a rank-dependent representation,
then this aspect of the decision is carried by %N .
4.1 Aspirations as Pure Risk
Lola Lopes posited a dual criterion theory of decision making under
risk (1987) which she called SP/A theory. This theory was not
intended to be a normative theory of rational decision making, but
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rather a descriptive theory incorporating a psychological perspective
on how individuals assess risk. However, being concerned with the
psychology of risk it contains insights into an approach to risk that
is intuitively appealing, as well as providing data to support these
insights. The …rst criterion is Security vs. Potential (SP) which
is concerned with how people focus di¤erentially on the extreme
good outcomes, or the extreme bad outcomes depending on the
degree to which they are motivated by achieving security (fear)
or achieving potential (hope). This component of the model is
essentially an exposition of the Principle of Attention, leading the
decision maker to overweight certain outcomes relative to other
depending of the ranking of the particular outcome. It is a form
of RDU which was given a later mathematical formulation (Lopes
and Oden 1999) which involves a linear utility function and a
decision weighting function that (whilst unaxiomatised and reliant
on some unsubstantiated assumptions (see Davies 2004)) gave a
similar inverse-S shape to those proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1992) or Prelec (1998). In requiring no utility transformation of
numerical values and simultaneously transforming probabilities, the
SP criterion e¤ectively removes one component of an EUT based
theory such as CPT (that of utility curvature), whilst retaining the
descriptive psychological component of decision weighting. For the
purposes of SP/A this was a simpli…cation that seemed justi…able
in terms of the theory’s ability to …t the data, but will not lead us
to a normative measure of risk. It is interesting, however, that in
discussing the psychology of risk, Lopes feels no need to discuss the
forms of risk that are derivative on the shape of the utility function
except in a negative context to point out that these do not seem to
be adequate descriptions of risk as a psychological notion.
The second criterion of Aspiration (A), however, contains the
kernel of a rational theory of risk. Lopes postulates that individuals
have an aspiration level (which may di¤er for each decision being
made) and that, in addition to maximising the SP criterion,
they also wish to maximise the probability that they achieve the
appropriate aspiration level. These aspirations will be a¤ected by
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what opportunities are available and by constraints imposed by the
environment. Even a risk averse person may still be inclined to take
large risks if playing it safe in a particular context will not provide
a high enough outcome to ensure survival, whereas taking a risk at
least provides this possibility. For example, an impoverished farmer
who realises that he will be unable to meet subsistence levels even by
planting entirely with low risk subsistence crops, may instead quite
rationally choose to take the risky alternative of planting cash crops
which might at least provide a possibility of achieving the minimum
survival level (Lopes 1987; Shefrin and Statman 2000). Aspiration
will be determined by what the subject considers “reasonable or safe
to hope for”, by the in‡uence of the other alternatives available,
and by the in‡uence of the external environment. These will all
serve to provide the “frame” in which the choice is made and will
all change the way in which the individual approaches the decision.
Thus, regardless of the desire for security or potential on the part of
the decision maker, the aspiration factor means that the person will
also seek to maximise the chance that the aspiration level is reached.
Technically, in Lopes’ model the decision maker seeks not only
to maximise the score on the SP criterion, but also to minimise the
probability of not achieving the aspiration level. Letting ® represent
the aspiration level, this means maximising A = Pr (x > ®). This
conception of risk is entirely absent from all the traditional measures
reviewed above. That the probability of achieving some aspiration
level is a psychologically plausible consideration when choosing
among risky options is supported by Lopes’ 1987 protocol analyses,
as well as descriptive data (Lopes 1987, Lopes and Oden 1999, Payne
2004) and simple introspection. This notion has also been widely
mentioned and discussed, but rarely formalised as a theoretical basis
for risk (Dubins and Savage 1976; March and Shapira 1992; Payne
2004; Roy 1952; Sokolowska and Pohorille 2000; Sokolowska 2003). I
propose to use this concept as the cornerstone of Pure Risk Theory.
The …rst way in which Lopes criterion does not meet our
requirements is easily amended. Her theory applies only to initial
consequences described in monetary values. We wish, however,
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to ask how this criterion would be applied by a hypothetical
individual whose preference ordering embodies only PR attitude,
%N . By assuming that this hypothetical individual is making a
decision between acts where the consequences already encompass
all choice preferences but his own, we can adapt Lopes’ criterion
to A = Pr
¡
uN > ®
¢
, where ® is a PR neutral utility level. That
is, the PR attitude is concerned solely with the probability of
achieving a PR neutral utility (which therefore incorporates a full
consideration of all non-PR choice concerns from %N) that is greater
than some level utility given by ®. Put another way, the PR neutral
utilities uN re‡ect the preference ordering of the individual in the
absence of the desire to achieve some minimum aspiration level. %N
incorporates all the same factors that might in‡uence the decision as
% (including possibly loss aversion, attitudes to money and attitudes
to probability) with the exception of the resorting of the options
implied by the attitude to PR, which is precisely that the individual
wishes to maximise A = Pr
¡
uN > ®
¢
.
It is important to see here that %N is hypothetical - the overall
preference ordering % includes the individual’s attitudes to PR and,
in attempting to de…ne what that attitude consists of we have gone
backwards to a hypothetical preference ordering that excludes these
risk attitudes. PR attitude is thus acting on the hypothetical entities
uN which represent the utilities that would be allocated to the
preference ordering %N were the individual not to have any attitude
to PR. This method may seem somewhat circular in that I postulate
a theory of PR that acts on the utilities that would obtain were
we to remove any attitude to this notion of PR. However, working
this way has a number of advantages in that in enables us to work
directly with preference orderings rather than with consequences,
and it enables us, through construction, to eliminate all other aspects
of the decision that might in‡uence the preference ordering in ways
that given the appearance of relating to risk attitude but are, in
fact, completely unrelated. It may help to view the problem in terms
of breaking the individual’s preferences between gambles down into
two components: the overall preference ordering % is decomposed
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(hypothetically) into those preferences that would be observed in
the absence of any attitude to PR %N , and those preferences that
consist solely of these attitudes to PR. The overall preferences may
thus be retrieved from %N by imagining that a decision maker that
embodies only your PR attitudes is given a decision that consists of a
series of acts for which all the consequences are completely described
by the utilities uN. The theory of PR needs to provide a convincing
story for how this hypothetical decision maker, who embodies solely
PR attitudes, would make this decision. If this can be done, and
our version of Lopes’ aspiration criterion is the …rst step, we have
described what it is to have an attitude to PR as well as how to
switch between %N and %.
Claim: Pure Risk is related to the concept of achieving an
aspiration level; the probability of attaining an outcome above some
aspiration level. Since Pure Risk is not the only component of
the decision process, the aspiration level must re‡ect non-Pure Risk
aspects of the decision and must therefore be evaluated on Pure Risk
neutral utility levels.
4.2 Problems with Simple Aspiration as Pure Risk
This particular version of what it is to have an attitude to PR is
extremely simplistic and poses a number of problems. However, there
are already bene…cial comments that can be made about the general
approach that incorporates aspiration levels. Firstly, it encapsulates
a measure of risk that is congruous with the intuitive idea that
avoiding risk is somehow about avoiding the worst that can happen.
In minimising the probability that your realised PR neutral utility is
below some important level, one has reduced the chance of the worst
happening which is surely very close to the way in which many people
think about risk. The aspiration level criterion is analogous to the
Value at Risk (VaR) measure used in practical …nance where ® is
a measure of risk determined by the value at a constant percentile
of the distribution. For example, VaR at 5% is the loss (i.e., value
of ®) that would only be exceeded of 5% of trading days. The fact
that an aspiration level type criterion is used as the most in‡uential
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risk measure in the …nance industry is indicative of the degree to
which the folk psychology of risk is captured by examining the most
extreme downside of an outcome distribution.
The major problem with the Aspiration criterion, however,
is its essential arbitrariness: how precisely do we choose the
aspiration point ®? And how do we defend this choice against other
possible contenders? Lopes gives little guidance on this question
beyond suggesting that it may be in‡uenced by many factors,
both psychological and environmental. A survival level of outcome
certainly seems an appropriate choice in many development economic
contexts, but has little resonance where the decision maker is not
living at subsistence levels. In any case, it may be reasonable to
assume that utility levels cannot go below that associated with the
survival level so this level is a lower bound on utility (i.e., if ® is the
survival level, then Pr
¡
uN > ®
¢
= 1 by de…nition5) and thus this
aspiration level will have no e¤ect on the PR neutral choice.
In many (or indeed most) cases considered in the applied decision
making, however, the survival level with not be of great concern,
particularly with regard to much …nancial decision making. A
number of other contenders can be envisaged for the aspiration
level though. One is the status quo reference level (i.e., the point
of zero utility in a reference dependent context). This makes the
aspiration level and the reference point identical, but it is certainly
a level that could be argued to have some special signi…cance in
that the individual might care disproportionately about avoiding a
loss and thus seek to minimising the probability of this occurring
(independently of the utilities assigned to these outcomes) (Payne
2004). However, I believe that this is a descriptive point that doesn’t
5This point is perhaps somewhat contentious as it is easy to image situations where
decision makers ascribe utility levels above the lower bound to outcomes that involve
death. These may vary according to the manner in which death came about, such as
the case where honourable death in battle is assigned a high utility at the time that
choices are being made, whereas a cowardly death is not. Certainly these attitudes may
in‡uence risk attitude during life. It is also true that people both live with and, in
some cases (e.g., polar explorers) intentionally face, a small probability of death on a
daily basis. An alternative approach may be to postulate some utility associated with
non-survival whilst retaining the assumption that there is some lower bound on utility
- this leads us well out of the world of …nancial decision making, but certainly is an
assumption employed to great e¤ect by organised religion over the centuries.
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have any particular normative justi…cation, particularly when we
consider that the distinction between gains and losses is already
incorporated directly into the perceptual transformation and loss
aversion. Another possible natural aspiration level might be some
form of peer group benchmark: one might plausibly wish to minimise
the probability of not achieving some benchmark utility level relative
to others. A …nancial example of this “keeping up with the Joneses”
e¤ect can be found in fund management where fund performance is
measured less on the absolute returns, and more on returns relative
to some industry benchmark. No doubt plausible justi…cations can
be found for numerous other possible aspiration points in speci…c
contexts. In addition, since we do not require that outcomes need to
take descriptions in terms of a numerical scale it will not be clear how
speci…c aspiration points might be identi…ed. The PR free utilities
uN are numerical, but only unique up to an a¢ne transformation6
and it will not necessarily be clear how to select given values of uN for
special consideration points without perhaps singling out particular
outcome descriptions for special attention.
Since minimising the risk of not achieving a single aspiration
point does not completely determine a theory of PR, and since the
description of the aspiration point is essentially arbitrary and may
di¤er from context to context, could we not argue that each of the
possible contenders has a role to play and that a true notion of
risk requires that we simultaneously minimise the probability of not
achieving multiple utility aspiration points ®i? If, for example we
were to postulate two aspiration points this would imply that we
would be concerned with minimising both the probability of not
achieving the lower aspiration level, A1 = pr
¡
uN < ®1
¢
, as well as
the further criterion of minimising the probability mass between the
lower and the higher aspirations, A2 = pr
¡
®1 < uN < ®2
¢
.
This would be a step forward, but does not go far enough, and
would result in a theory of rational decision making that required
an unspeci…ed number of risk minimisation goals to be added to
the maximisation goal, each of which is still arbitrary in nature. In
6With SEU as the underlying basis for %N . The axioms of CPT are more restrictive.
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addition, there now exists a problem of how these multiple criteria
are to be combined. They surely cannot all be given equal weight?
As a …rst approximation it seems reasonable that the aspiration of
surviving is more important than that of not taking a loss, which
is in turn more important than reaching a positive benchmark.
Perhaps the aspiration points should take a lower weighting as the
threshold associated with each increases. In addition, the weight
would depend crucially on the distance between the aspiration points
- an aspiration that was only just higher than another point would
need to have a commensurately smaller weight if the incremental
probability mass between the two was not to get a disproportionately
large weighting.
4.3 Aspiration Weighting Function
Instead of multiple aspiration points, I wish to argue that our
rational notion of risk minimisation can be incorporated into a single
goal by stipulating that every possible PR neutral utility point is an
aspiration point. This enables us to arrive at a preference condition
for PR. Since the hypothetical PR neutral utility allocations uN
re‡ect all aspects of the preference ordering % except PR attitude it
must be the case that if one possible act f has a higher probability of
satisfying an aspiration level than another act g, for every possible
aspiration level, then this preference ordering %PRconcerned only
with PR attitude, must have f%PRg. A decision maker who chose f
would have a higher probability of achieving any possible aspiration
level than one who chose g.
Claim: (PR Neutral Dominance) If, for any two acts f and g
we have Prf
¡
uN ¸ ®¢ ¸ Prg ¡uN ¸ ®¢ for all ®, then f %PR g.
This preference condition e¤ectively tells us that, if we equate
PR with the chance of not achieving a desired outcome (where the
outcomes are in terms of PR neutral utility, and are thus fully
adjusted for any other aspects of the overall preference ordering
that do not re‡ect PR) then we must never choose a gamble that is
dominated for all possible aspiration levels.
At …rst sight this proposition is not that much use to us as it
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deals only with pairs of acts of which one is dominated by the other
at every possible aspiration level. The criterion also requires that
we compare any two acts for an in…nity of aspiration levels which
are themselves on hypothetical PR neutral utilities. However, notice
that the criterion given in the proposition is precisely that of …rst-
order stochastic dominance (sd) applied to PR neutral utility.
For a distribution F
¡
uN
¢
to …rst-order stochastically dominate
another G
¡
uN
¢
requires that
F
³
uN
´
· G
³
uN
´
for all uN (1)
which is precisely the criterion in the proposition above.
Applying standard stochastic dominance results this means that
there exists a function of uN , which I term the Aspiration Weighting
Function ®
¡
uN
¢
such that:
Proposition: (Bawa) If, for any two acts f and g we have
F
¡
uN
¢ · G ¡uN¢ for all uN (so f %PR g) thenZ
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
¸
Z
®
³
uN
´
dG
³
uN
´
(2)
if and only if ®
¡
uN
¢
is a nondecreasing function.
If stochastic dominance is to be satis…ed for any two distributions,
then the Aspiration Weighting Function must be nondecreasing.
Bawa (1975) provides a proof of this for the case where the function
is bounded from below. That is, if ®
¡
uN
¢
only needs to be
de…ned for utility above a certain level (presumably analogous to
the survival level, below which the concept of aspiration ceases to
have meaning) then stochastic dominance over PR neutral utilities is
equivalent to an upward sloping aspiration weighting function. This
use of dominance enables us to represent PR attitude using a single
transformation of PR neutral utilities using an Aspiration Weighting
Function.
The act chosen by an individual whose preference ordering
embodies only PR attitude would be the act with the highest
expected value of aspiration weighted PR neutral utility. Thus, the
full intuition of the need to avoid PR can be expressed as the need
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to maximise the total expected utility
U =
Z
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
or (3)
U = E
h
®
³
uN
´i
(4)
Conclusion: Pure Risk attitude is related to the probability
of not achieving levels of utility that account for all aspects of
choice except Pure Risk. All possible aspiration levels (and thus the
entire distribution of PR neutral utility) are important for Pure Risk
attitude, and an act that is PR neutral dominant will be as least as
good as the alternative act. The decision maker will therefore choose
the act that maximises
U = E
h
®
³
uN
´i
where ®
¡
uN
¢
is a nondecreasing aspiration weighting function that
transforms PR neutral utility, UN , to …nal utility U .
®
¡
uN
¢
is a consequence of extending Lopes’ Aspiration criterion
to an in…nite number of aspiration levels over the whole space of
possible PR neutral utility outcomes. Lopes justi…es her aspiration
criterion by an appeal to the psychology of risk and to empirical data
that observed choices over distributions of outcomes show patterns
that cannot be accommodated within a traditional model that solely
maximises some version of expected utility (Lopes 1987, 1996, and
Lopes and Oden 1999). These justi…cations are still important within
my normative model of PR as I am arguing that the notion of
risk embedded in the extension of aspiration level to an aspiration
function is inherently intuitive from a deep psychological point of
view.
With the addition of an additional assumption we can put some
further structure on the shape of the function. ®
¡
uN
¢
governs
the degree to which the decision maker is more or less concerned
with achieving lower values of uN when faced with a choice. An
intuition for the slope of ®
¡
uN
¢
can be provided when we see
that the slope governs the importance given to each increment of
the cumulative distribution of uN . By following through on our
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intuition that ful…lling a given Aspiration point should become less
important, the higher the level of utility attached to that point
(i.e., the importance of each incremental gain in uN is decreasing
in uN) it must be the case that the aspiration weighting function is
concave as well as nondecreasing. In this case the choice between
distributions over PR neutral utilities in addition satis…es second-
order stochastic dominance (Bawa 1975) This notion of PR also
satis…es our intuitions about risk as being an inherently downside
concept.
In addition, the concavity of the aspiration weighting function
may be derived if we apply to PR theory Yaari’s (1969) general
de…nition of risk aversion. The fact the one individual’s acceptance
set is contained in another’s implies that the …rst decision maker
is more risk averse. For PR theory, as for SEU, Yaari’s de…nition
characterises a concave function. Like the value function, the
aspiration weighting function will be unique only up to an a¢ne
transformation.
Proposition: If the importance attached to achieving any given
aspiration level of uN is greater the lower the level, then the
aspiration function is concave as well as nondecreasing, and Pure
Risk attitude satis…es second-order stochastic dominance. This also
precisely characterises Pure Risk aversion.
The value of U = E
£
®
¡
uN
¢¤
given to each act is necessarily
equal to the …nal expected utility of that act when the original
consequences of the act, cij , are evaluated by the total preference
function % so we have:Z
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
=
Z
udF (u) (5)
The PR neutral utilities uN embody all aspects of preference except
PR attitude. PR attitude is thus all that is required to apply to UN
in order to transform the PR neutral utility to the …nal utility U .
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4.4 An Alternative Derivation of Pure Risk
A striking aspect of this criterion is its similarity to the primary
criterion of expected utility maximisation which, when applied to
monetary consequences, is given by
U =
Z
u (x) dF (x) (6)
There is, however, a crucial di¤erence: expected utility maximi-
sation thus expressed is the expectation of the utility of monetary
outcomes, whereas PR is an expectation on a transformation of PR
neutral utility values themselves.
Nonetheless because (3) is an expected utility representation over
acts with PR neutral outcomes, it must be the case that %PR
is a rational preference ordering that obeys some set of axioms
that permit such a representation. Certainly, since we are after a
normative theory of PR, it would not seem desirable for %PR to
violate the axiomatic structure of SEU. This also suggests a possible
way of axiomatising the theory of PR. If we are prepared to assume in
advance that %PR obeys the axioms of SEU when applied to uN, then
any axiomatisation of SEU can be adapted to produce a criterion of
PR. So, constraining %PR to satisfy continuity and independence, it
must be the case that there exists a function ®
¡
uN
¢
, such that
f %PR g )
Z
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
¸
Z
®
³
uN
´
dG
³
uN
´
In addition, given the monotonicity of uN (in the absence of
uncertainty the individual will always prefer greater certain PR
Neutral utility to less) we may say that ®
¡
uN
¢
is increasing. Because
it is tautologically true that more PR neutral utility is preferred to
less if it is obtained with certainty, the aspiration weighting function
must be positively related to …nal utility. However, the fact that %PR
obeys the axioms of SEU is not su¢cient to guarantee the concavity
of ®
¡
uN
¢
which, as before, must come from additional assumptions
about the declining importance of aspiration as the level increases.
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4.5 Restrictions on the Aspiration Weighting Function
For two prospects with identical valuations from a PR neutral
perspective (so E
£
uN
¤
is the same for both), the prospect that is
less Purely Risky will necessarily have the higher utility U. We may
thus use ¡E £® ¡uN¢¤ to obtain a measure of PR of a distribution
over uN for a given decision maker:
PR = ¡E
h
®
³
uN
´i
(7)
The fact that PR is always concerned with minimising the cumula-
tive probabilities (i.e., is inherently concerned with the downside),
means that, given a consistent set of PR neutral utilities, in max-
imising E
£
®
¡
uN
¢¤
we are naturally minimising PR.
To put further structure on the aspiration function we need to
delve deeper into the existing literature on risk measures. This is
a surprisingly sparse literature, probably because without a notion
of PR, SEU leaves little wriggle room for introducing additional
measures of risk. The literature attempts either to add a risk
measure as a secondary variable to be considered in addition to
SEU (Coombs 1975), to derive measures of perceived risk that are
incidental to the actual preference structure over outcomes (Pollatsek
and Tversky 1970; Luce 1980; Sarin 1987), or to examine risk
measures for practical application in …nance with no necessary link
to the normative theories of SEU (Szegö 2002).
All of these measures have been concerned primarily with the
measurement of risk inherent in monetary outcomes and not with
separating a concept of PR from risk e¤ects derived from other
sources. However, the axiomatic approaches to risk measurement
used by Pollatsek and Tversky, Luce, and Sarin may be easily applied
to gambles over PR neutral utilities and, since they intended to
axiomatise a measurement of risk alone, some of the axioms may
have better traction when applied to that component of choice
which by de…nition focusses solely on PR. Sarin (1987) uses two
assumptions to derive a model of risk, both of which may be
placed within the context of PR. I present the assumptions here,
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adapted somewhat to …t the purposes of the current framework.
Our risk measure for a density function f on uN is the value of
PR (f) = ¡ R ® ¡uN¢ dF ¡uN¢ as required in our framework. This
PR measure is de…ned relative to the density function f on random
variable UN. If a constant amount ¯ is added to every PR neutral
utility in a gamble we de…ne the density of the modi…ed gamble
as f¯. Sarin’s …rst assumption is that the PR of the modi…ed
density PR
¡
f¯
¢
is a multiplicative function of PR (f) and ¯. This
assumption is justi…ed by both intuition and evidence that the PR of
an option should decrease when a constant is added to all outcomes
of the gamble (Pollatsek and Tversky 1970; Coombs and Lehner
1981; Keller, Sarin, and Weber 1986; Jia, Dyer, and Butler 1999).
Assumption 1: (Risk Multiplicitivity) There is a strictly monotonic
function S such that for all density functions f and all real ¯ > 0.
PR
³
f ¯
´
= PR (f )S (¯) (8)
S (¯) is strictly decreasing if PR : f ! R+ and strictly increasing
if PR : f ! R¡.
The second assumption used by Sarin (and by Luce 1980) is that
the densities can be aggregated into a single number using a form of
expectation.
Assumption 2: There is a function T such that for all densities
f
PR (f) =
Z
T
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
= E
h
T
³
uN
´i
(9)
This assumption is already satis…ed given the structure required
for PR theory.
Pure Risk Theory and Risk Multiplicitivity together ensure that
the aspiration weighting function takes the form
®
³
uN
´
=
1¡ e¡½uN
½
with ½ > 0.
Sarin (1987) proves that given these two assumptions, (which
amount to the sole additional assumption of multiplicitivity for
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PRT), that, for some constants K and c,
PR (f) =
Z
Kecu
N
dF
³
uN
´
(10)
where K > 0, c < 0, or K < 0, c > 0.
Given our de…nition of PR, this implies
®
³
uN
´
= ¡KecuN
and since ®
¡
uN
¢
is required to be nondecreasing and concave, we
can restrict the constants to K > 0, c < 0. In addition, given that
®
¡
uN
¢
is unique only to an a¢ne transformation, we can de…ne
½ = ¡c, and K = 1½, and add the constant 1½ , to obtain
®
³
uN
´
=
1¡ e¡½uN
½
(11)
with ½ > 0 as a single parameter that governs the curvature of
the aspiration weighting function, and thereby the degree of risk
aversion.
4.6 A Measure of Pure Risk Aversion
Analogous to traditional risk concepts we can also de…ne the degree
of PR aversion implied by the aspiration function for any given
distribution over PR utility. Standard risk aversion over monetary
may be characterised by whether the certainty equivalent of the
evaluation is above or below the expected value of the distribution.
A risk averse individual will always prefer the expected value of any
distribution received with certainty, to the gamble of the distribution
itself. The certainty equivalent is the certain amount for which
the decision maker is indi¤erent between receiving that amount or
playing the gamble. For our PR criterion with a concave aspiration
weighting function, PR aversion is an inherent property of the
theory. Any rational person will thus at least prefer to attain the
expect utility to playing the prospect. We de…ne the Pure Certainty
Equivalent (uNPCE) as that utility level which satis…es:
®
³
uNPCE
´
=
Z
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
(12)
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With a concave aspiration weighting function it will always be the
case that ®
¡
uNPCE
¢ · E ¡uN¢.
Because of the tight analogy between the criterion of PR, and
EUT applied to monetary outcomes, it is possible to adapt many of
the results applicable to this latter theory. For example, the degree
of PR aversion is dependent on the degree of relative concavity of
the aspiration weighting function - the greater the curvature, the
greater the PR aversion. We may thus employ an analogy of the
Arrow-Pratt coe¢cients of risk aversion: the absolute coe¢cient of
PR aversion at utility level uN may be de…ned as
PRA
³
uN
´
= ¡®00
³
uN
´
=®0
³
uN
´
(13)
and the relative coe¢cient of PR at uN is
PRR
³
uN
´
= ¡uN®00
³
uN
´
=®0
³
uN
´
(14)
Using these concepts it becomes possible to investigate how PR
attitude varies with overall utility levels. Note though, that with
(11) as the aspiration weighting function we have
PRA
³
uN
´
= ¡®00
³
uN
´
=®0
³
uN
´
= ¡ e
¡½uN
¡½e¡½uN
=
1
½
(15)
and
PRR
³
uN
´
=
uN
½
Thus, an individual will display constant absolute PR aversion,
and increasing relative PR aversion, unless the PR parameter ½
itself varies with the PR-neutral utility level. This last observation
appears very likely to hold and, whilst, this is not the place to
explore these e¤ects in detail, there are a number of examples in
the literature which tend to indicate that risk taking increases as
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the survival level is approached. Kunreuther and Wright (1979)
describe this tendency for subsistence farmers (as discussed later by
Lopes 1987). It has been observed too in troubled …rms (Bowman
1982; Bromiley and Wiseman 1989), as well as in the …eld of animal
behaviour, where foraging choices get more risky as the calori…c
survival threshold is approached (Kacelnik and Bateson 1996). If
the animal is unlikely to survive even with the yield of the sure
food source, it becomes optimal to exhibit risk seeking behaviour as
this provides the only chance of survival. On the other hand PR
aversion also seems to decrease where the current levels of utility
are extremely high because the notion of PR loses its bite for the
extremely wealthy (March and Shapira 1992). This might indicate
that, although from any given status quo point we might expect
constant absolute PR aversion, this is still governed by the PR
parameter ½ which might be responsive to shifts in the reference
point.
5 Pure Risk Prospect Theory
In the exposition above I have outlined a theory of PR that
forms a single component of any preference structure that admits a
utility representation (or a utility and probability weighting function
representation). PRT can thus be made fully compatible with SEU
or RDU, or variations thereon. It relates to a component of the
manner in which utilities are allocated to consequences within these
theories, and not to any aspect of the …nal utility allocation itself.
This structure, however, is highly theoretical and not of a great deal
of use to us until we specify fully the remainder of the in‡uences
of choice within which it operates. We have derived the aspiration
weighting function that describes the e¤ect of PR attitude on PR
neutral utilities. However, these utilities uN are hypothetical and
unobservable entities. To use the theory we need to be able to
apply it to actual choices, not to hypothetical transformations of
these choices. This requires a speci…cation of the content of the PR
neutral preference ordering %N .
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Examining Figure 3 we now see that the advent of PR theory
allows us to partially (or perhaps completely) plug the gap that was
left by the fact the standard value function, which I denote as above
by v (x) did not include any such considerations. The move from uN
to u is now fully accounted for by %PR and thus by PR. As can be
seen from the diagram, this still leaves two potential gaps in how we
allocate the correct utilities to the original preference ordering. This
depends on how completely we can take v (x) to be a complete proxy
for the PR neutral preference ordering %N . If we ignore for the time
being the problem of converting descriptions of the consequences to
numerical valuations x to which we can apply the value function
v (x), then our problem reduces to ensuring that v (x) accounts for
all aspects of choice that relate monetary values to utility, and that
are not accounted for by PR attitude. I shall take CPT to be the
basis for this as it allows the most comprehensive set of e¤ects to
be brought to bear on this evaluation. Thus, v (x) may be taken
to include reference dependent utilities, diminishing sensitivity from
the reference point, as well as loss aversion. In addition, following
Schmidt (2003) and Sugden (2003) we may allow these e¤ects to
vary as the reference point is varied. That is, whilst the utility
of a potential outcome is measured in terms of its deviation from
the reference point, the form of the function that performs this
translation may change as the reference point itself shifts. If it is the
case that these e¤ects capture exhaustively the rational and PR free
attitudes to monetary outcomes, then the gap between v (x) and uN
has been closed completely. It may well be the case, however, that
there are some (or even many) psychological or psychophysical e¤ects
that in‡uence our attitudes to money of which we are currently
unaware. If this is the case then v (x) will at best be a good proxy,
limited by our current knowledge for the translation of monetary
values to PR neutral utilities.
A further component of %N that warrants discussion, though not
a gap in the sense used above is the existence of non-linear decision
weights. Since rank-dependence is clearly not a part of PR theory
and arises from probability distortions rather than an attitude to
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PR, rank dependence is not taken to be part of the preference
ordering %PR. Thus, if overall preferences are to be a¤ected by
probability distortions, then these must be part of the PR neutral
preference ordering. The expectation in (3) which arrives at the
…nal evaluation of the act is thus taken with respect to subjective
probabilities, including any distortion due to decision weights, if
appropriate. There is no second probability distortion through the
agency of PR neutral preferences. Also, since what occurs in %N
is independent of the preference ordering %PR (which acts only on
the resulting allocations of %N) it should be possible to postulate
any desired form of decision weighting, without an in‡uence on
PR attitudes. As Birnbaum has demonstrated (2004) empirical
choice appears to violate stochastic dominance in numerous cases.
Since both CPT type decision weights and PR preserve stochastic
dominance, these violations will not be explained by the addition of
PR attitudes to a CPT based model. However, the concept of PR
is equally consistent (descriptively at least) with other con…gural
weight models that predict the appropriate violations of stochastic
dominance. This hybrid would be a model that combines the
descriptive power of con…gural weight models, the psychological
power of reference dependent value functions, and the normative
power of PR theory. It is unlikely that a purely normative theory will
ever enable us to explain all empirically observed data, even where
error models are included. If however, as PR theory suggests, we
have so far been omitting a signi…cant normative component, then
including this may be expected to increase the accuracy of future
descriptive models as well.
Up to this point in CPT a decision weighting function and a value
function have been used to go directly from monetary outcomes to
…nal utility values. This has been based on the assumption that
a combination of rank dependence, reference dependence and loss
aversion are the sum total of e¤ects that in‡uence decision making
under risk. In essence, the values v (x) have been used as proxies
for the …nal utilities u that are required to actually preserve the
preference ordering through their expected values. As we have seen,
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the existence of PR attitude would mean that the value function
has been stretched too far - we have tried to incorporate e¤ects that
are due to PR into parameterisations of utility curvature and loss
aversion. In addition, because decision weights also in‡uence overall
risk attitude, estimates of the weighting functions may also have
been registering some of the e¤ects of PR attitude, even though it
does not govern the translation from monetary outcomes to utility.
However, if these components do cover all or the great majority of
e¤ects in evaluating acts over monetary outcomes, then v (x) may
be a good or even complete proxy for uN . Using this insight we can
adapt CPT to form PR Prospect Theory (PRPT), making the usual
simplifying assumption of CPT that all consequences can be fully
described by monetary outcomes.
5.1 The Structure of PRPT
Using the PR formulations of (4) and (11) we have:
U =
Z
®
³
uN
´
d¦
³
uN
´
= E¦
h
®
³
uN
´i
= E¦
"
1¡ e¡½uN
½
#
(16)
where E¦ [¢] is the subjective expectation using the imputed distrib-
ution ¦ given by the non-linear decision weights of CPT. I will not
discuss here the decision weighting function in further detail as it is
unchanged by the addition of PR and has been thoroughly discussed
elsewhere (e.g. Davies and Satchell 2004a).
Given the assumption that the reference dependent value function
and loss aversion encompass the entirety of non-PR responses to
monetary amounts, we have in addition
uN (x) =
½
v+ (x) if x ¸ 0
¸v¡ (x) if x < 0
(17)
where the monetary outcomes are measured relative to the reference
point such that v (0) = 0. We also have that the value function is
increasing v0 (x) > 0. Maintaining the assumption of diminishing
sensitivity which is supported by much of the empirical data,
particularly for median or representative individuals, implies that
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the value function is convex for losses (v00¡ (x) > 0) and concave for
gains (v00+(x) < 0)7. Combining these two gives PRPT:
U = E¦
"
1 ¡ e¡½v+(x)
½
jx ¸ 0
#
+ E¦
"
1 ¡ e¡½¸v¡(x)
½
jx < 0
#
(18)
Köbberling and Wakker (2003) propose an exponential value
function which, given their de…nition of the loss aversion index,
enables us to exactly separate loss aversion from utility curvature
whilst retaining an index of loss aversion that is invariant to the unit
of payment. Were we to employ the same function here, the overall
transformation from monetary outcomes to utility would require a
double exponential transformation: once of the reference dependent
values through an exponential that is concave above x = 0 and
convex below, and the second time of the resulting uN through a
globally concave exponential that re‡ects PR attitude. Thus, with
curvature of gains governed by g > 0, losses by l > 0 and loss
aversion by ¸ > 1, PR neutral utilities are:
uN (x) =
( 1¡e¡gx
g if x ¸ 0
¸
³
elx¡1
l
´
if x < 0
(19)
And the …nal utility allocations are:
u (x) =
8<: 1¡e
½
g (e¡gx¡1)
½ if x ¸ 0
1¡e½¸l (1¡elx)
½ if x < 0
(20)
PRPT incorporates the standard CPT value function into a utility
function that also accounts for attitudes to PR. Money outcomes
are, in this speci…cation, evaluated by an “expo-expo” function -
an exponential of an exponential. Using the more common power
function for the CPT value function would instead result in a “power-
expo” curve
u (x) =
8<: 1¡e
¡½xg
½ if x ¸ 0
1¡e½¸(¡x)l
½ if x < 0
(21)
7Although these data have ignored the potential e¤ects of PR and, as such have been
confounding multiple e¤ects.
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Both of these permit a far richer set of behaviour than than CPT
and, although an additional parameter has been introduced, this
PR parameter plays a normative role and may, in fact take on some
or all of the roles currently played by the descriptive parameters of
CPT. Indeed, when we examine closely the behaviour of the expo-
expo function over both gains and losses some very interesting results
emerge. Empirical data show that, for the CPT framework, the most
common pattern for individual choices has loss aversion (¸ > 1), and
a value function that is concave for gains (g < 1), convex for losses
(l < 1), and is more linear for losses than for gains (g < l).
Figure 4 shows a two parameter exponential CPT function that
cannot …t these patterns: ¸ = 1 so there is no loss aversion, and
the curvature for gains and losses is equal (g = l < 1). The
lower line shows the e¤ect of using these values as the CPT input
into PRPT. There are now only two parameters in the function,
g = l = 0:5 governs the curvature of both gains and losses in the
value function v (x), and ½ = 1 governs PR attitude. The values have
been chosen for illustrative purposes only. The resulting function
is steeper for losses than for gains in a manner that is consistent
with many de…nitions of loss aversion, but that does not require the
slopes to be di¤erent at the reference point from above and below.
It is also more linear for losses than for gains, without requiring
either e¤ect as assumptions of the model. PRPT can reproduce the
e¤ects of CPT with fewer parameters, and with greater normative
justi…cation. This is not to say that these psychophysical e¤ects do
not exist in reality and that a value function with all four parameters
would not do a signi…cantly better descriptive job. However, we can
now provide a normative basis for some e¤ects that had hitherto
been explained purely through descriptive patches to the model.
The expo-expo PRPT function also has the additional property
that it is concave for small losses before turning convex for larger
losses, whilst being everywhere concave for gains. The loss part of
this pattern …ts that referred to by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
as the “fourfold pattern of risk aversion”. Whilst this pattern can
also be produced through the functioning of decision weights (which
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might also imply such a reversal for gains), it could be an interesting
non-parametric test of PRPT to examine whether this asymmetry
could be produced after accounting for probability distortions.
Holt and Laury (2002) examine the degree of risk aversion
exhibited across a wide range of real payo¤s (in the gain domain) and
present data to show that a “power-expo” function captures the dual
e¤ects of increasing relative risk aversion which occurs as individuals
become more risk averse as the stakes rise, but decreasing absolute
risk aversion for large stakes which avoids the “Rabin critique”
(Rabin 2000) that the degree of risk aversion required to explain
choices for low stakes implies absurd levels of risk aversion for high
stakes. The expo-expo function has the same properties and both
functions have the desirable property that they permit risk aversion
to vary for gambles of di¤erent stakes in more complex ways than
traditional CPT which better …t empirical data of choices for real
payo¤s8.
A considerable part of the appeal of EUT (or derivative theories)
is our ability to apply it in a vast range of situations, particularly
those in economics and …nance where the outcomes can be described
by a monetary scale and then transformed into utility values through
the application of a parametric value function. Previous attempts
to describe observed choice data without PR have been inherently
misspeci…ed and, in the light of this it is perhaps unsurprising that
even the most sophisticated forms of EUT (such as CPT) have failed
to adequately describe observed choices for prospects other than
truly simple binary prospects (Luce 2000, Lopes and Oden 1999,
Birnbaum, Patten and Lott 1999). How much of the pattern of
choices currently attributed to loss aversion, curved utility, or non-
linear decision weights is actually a re‡ection of a rational attitude
to PR? A great deal of further work will need to be done to test these
speculations, and all these concepts may have a place in describing
the overall risk attitude to uncertainty over monetary outcomes.
However, adding PR adds a great deal of explanatory power to the
8Holt and Laury report that hypothetical payo¤s do not show increasing relative risk
aversion with higher stakes, which may explain why the CARA power function has often
provided a successful …t in experiments with large, but hypothetical stakes.
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model and may begin to resolve such issues as why the curvature of
the utility function required to adequately express reasonable risk
aversion over small amounts implies absurd risk aversion over larger
amounts (Rabin 2000); or why no single combination of parametric
forms for the utility function and the decision weighting function
seems to be able to account for data across numerous data sets
(Burness and Neilson 2000); or why rank-dependent utility models
fail to explain existing empirical data as soon as prospects are more
complex than binary alternatives (Luce 2000).
5.2 The Description Gap in PRPT
PR Prospect Theory builds the concept of PR into a framework that
can be used practically used to assess choices between monetary
gambles. Nonetheless, it requires the assumption that there is no
non-monetary descriptive element to the outcomes of these gambles
- an assumption that is not required of PRT itself. Neither, however,
can PRT be used to …ll this gap. This needs to come from future
theoretical developments. In my opinion this gap may never be
…lled as it incorporates a number of e¤ects which rely on the
unique circumstances of each decision, the decision environment, the
individual concerned and temporal and social aspects of the decision.
Nonetheless, a great deal of work is now starting to provide the basis
for how we might begin to adjust a theory like PRPT for observable,
generalisable and measurable aspects of the non individual, and
non-“rational” components of the decision. Amongst many others,
the gap between complete descriptions of the outcomes, and their
restricted monetary tags may arise from: mental accounting which
labels money distinctly according to its origin or planned purpose;
issues of framing which cause identical numerical outcomes to appear
di¤erent; social preferences which include considerations of fairness,
equality, and reciprocity; reason-based thinking which requires that
choices be justi…ed either internally or externally with adequate
reasons for that behaviour; strategic issues and planning which locate
the outcomes of that choice within a larger framework about how the
act of making that choice will in‡uence other choices of the decision
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makers, and of others around her; and issues of self-control and
symbolic utility (Nozick 1993) where the choice of an act comes to
stand for an entire class of acts and thus acquires a symbolic utility
that transcends the monetary values in the numerically described
outcomes.
Notwithstanding the complexity of these issues, and the lack of
any over-arching theory to tie the strands together PR Theory now
provides a notion of risk that does not rely entirely on the translation
of numerical values to utility values, and thus can be included in the
same conceptual framework as any of these descriptive components.
In addition, in those many examples in economics and …nance where
the descriptive gap is small, PRT can enhance our attempts to
understand and model decision making by reintroducing risk as a
fundamental concept that drives our behaviour.
6 Speculations on Finance Theory
If Pure Risk plays a role in rational choice, then it has signi…cant
implications for the foundations of …nance theory. Indeed, by
introducing an entirely new normative concept of risk it provides
an entirely new grounding for the development of rational …nance
theory. These speculations will be carried further in a further set
of papers, but I would like to return brie‡y to the example of the
risk to return ratio commonly employed in …nance as a performance
measure or investment criterion. The Sharpe ratio (1966) which
divides expected (excess) returns by the standard deviation of the
returns was the …rst attempt to incorporate the insight that expected
return should be adjusted by the risk associated with that return -
choosing the highest expected return may not be a good investment
decision if it exposes the investor to considerable risks at the same
time. The ratio uses standard deviation of returns as the measure of
risk and, in employing returns directly, makes the assumption that
we care about returns directly, rather than the utility associated
with them. The ranking of options by the Sharpe ratio may be
completely captured by a mean-variance frontier, which assumes that
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either the distributions of returns can be completely described by
the mean and variance (e.g., normally distributed returns), or that
the investor cares only about these two aspects of the distribution
(which can be shown to be the case with a quadratic utility function)
(Pedersen and Rudholm-Alfvin 2003). In practice, however, neither
of these two conditions appear to hold and quadratic utility functions
have the undesirable property that absolute risk aversion increases
as individuals become more wealthy.
Furthermore, the concept of variance does not intuitively seem to
characterise that notion of risk about which we should be concerned
where choosing an investment - the fact that an investment has a
widely dispersed distribution above the mean would seem to most
people to be a good thing. It is losing money that they are concerned
about. Given these concerns a number of alternative measures were
developed that focussed on downside measures of risk, such as the
Lower Partial Moments (LPM) where only returns below a general
target are counted as contributing to risk. These approaches do not
generally arise out of any coherent theoretical model of preferences,
but rather re‡ect the desire to re‡ect the risk and return trade-
o¤ in a way that appeals to the intuitions of what is meant by
risk in an investment context. These measures are to a greater
or lesser degree analogous to the original Aspiration criterion used
by Lopes, and completely analogous in the probability of shortfall
(PS) measure which simply measures the probability of a return
below some target level. All su¤er from the same problem of Lopes’
measure though: the essential arbitrariness of choosing a single
target level that therefore ignores the e¤ect of the shape of most
of the distribution.
Note that in order to get practical measures that cohere with
an investor’s concept of risk, the industry has either had to turn
to ad hoc deviations from the supposed rational criterion of choice
under uncertainty, or has had to make highly restrictive and
unrealistic assumptions about the shape of return distributions or
the shape of the value function. Nonetheless, the …nance industry
has increasingly found it useful to make investment and portfolio
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decisions on the basis of risk adjusted return, or return per unit
of risk. Pure Risk overcomes these di¢culties at the same time as
providing a sound rationale for the normative status of a risk/return
trade-o¤. It o¤ers an intuitive measure of risk that is similar in spirit
to the ad hoc measures of the …nance industry and focuses naturally
on the true downside nature of risk, whilst removing the arbitrary
nature of choosing a particular target point.
Indeed, we can eliminate the need for a perceptual value function
altogether as it is possible to simultaneously have an investor that
does not experience diminishing marginal utility with respect to
money (an assumption that is often desirable for corporate entities
and which simply results in a linear utility function and thus no
risk aversion in the traditional sense) but that still holds a rational
desire to reduce risk. Speci…cally, we may postulate that the …rm
(or investor) should have no rational concern for the psychophysics
of money or a concern with loss aversion, so that uN = x, but still
allow this entity to have a rational concern for Pure Risk, so u =
® (x). This leads to a potential rational criterion for performance
evaluation, analogous to the Sharpe ratio. The rational choice of
investment to maximise U =
R
® (x)dF (x). To characterise this as
a performance measure in the spirit of the Sharpe ratio requires that
we de…ne a measure of risk ¯, such thatZ
® (x)dF (x) =
R
xdF (x)
¯
¯ =
R
xdF (x)R
® (x)dF (x)
The investor could vary the desired level of aversion to Pure Risk
by varying the parameter ½ in ® (x) for the appropriate context.
With this ratio any investment can be evaluated in terms of its
risk versus return as long as ½ remains constant for the comparison.
For a PR neutral individual, ¯ = 1 and thus the decision is based
on expected return only. For any level of Pure Risk attitude,
however, ¯ > 1 and increasing in the degree of Pure Risk. Thus
the performance of di¤erent funds could be evaluated according
to their stated degree of risk taking, rather than against the ex
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post benchmark o¤ered by the performance of their peers. This
ratio could be applied consistently to any distribution including
skewed distributions and those with fat tails, and would re‡ect the
shape of the entire distribution, rather than just a few moments
or partial moments. The parameter(s) in the aspiration weighting
would re‡ect the degree to which the potentially large losses in
the downside tail should be emphasised in the investment decision.
The advantages of splitting the overall evaluation into a return
component E [x] and a risk component ¯ are largely practical: the
division …ts with current standard practice in …nance, and it allows
the portrayal of investments on a risk/return frontier. However,
unlike the mean-variance frontier, the mean-¯ frontier does not
require unrealistic assumptions about either the shape of the value
function (which is here entirely linear, although one could easily
incorporate diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion if desired) or
the nature of return distributions. And yet, the mean-¯ frontier has
a …rm theoretical basis.
This is just one example of how Pure Risk seems to naturally
plug practical gaps that cannot be accommodated within standard
…nance theory. Its inherently downside ‡avour also holds out hope
that the theory may help to resolve many of the other extant puzzles
of …nance, such as the equity premium puzzle, whilst simultaneously
getting closer to the tenets of rationality, rather than further away
as has been the case with most recent attempts to resolve such
problems.
7 Discussion
In this paper I have argued that conventional theories of risk used
within the tradition of expected utility maximisation do not, in fact,
characterised attitudes to PR itself. Where risk has been introduced
as a concept within EUT its place is entirely subordinate to the way
in which utility is attached to monetary outcomes, or to the way
in which decision makers distort probabilities to arrive at decision
weights. There are two separable notions of risk inherent in the
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attribution of utility values to monetary outcomes: Loss Aversion
and the curvature of the function connecting outcomes to Basic
Utility values. However, neither of these satisfactorily incorporate
our intuitive notions of risk. Firstly they are entirely derived from
other primitive concepts. For the former this is the way in which we
psychologically evaluate gains relative to losses. For the latter the
risk is entirely dependent on the way in which our marginal utility of
money increases or decreases away from the reference point. Neither
of these concepts expresses an intuitive and primitive concept of
risk as something to be avoided, and in the case of utility curvature
even the directionality is unclear. Secondly, the notions of risk thus
derived are only relevant to situations where the utility of an outcome
is directly and completely related to an underlying monetary scale.
That is, if there is no utility function translating monetary outcomes
to utility, then these concepts of loss aversion and utility curvature
do not exist. In short, the traditional model of rational choice in a
risky environment has hitherto completely lacked a model to explain
precisely that element which makes the environment complex: it
lacks a theory of risk.
I propose a theory of PR precisely …lls this gap. I have shown
how the concept of PR arises naturally from the extension of
intuitive psychological notions of risk to continuous distributions.
In particular, a natural, but basic, notion of risk is found in Lopes’
concept of an Aspiration level: risk is the probability of not achieving
a particular level of utility. This embodies the inherently negative
‡avour of risk - we should rationally wish to minimise the probability
of not achieving our goals. It is instructive that this approach to risk
is commonplace in the practical approaches of the …nance industry.
To overcome the problem that the choice of any particular aspiration
level is essentially arbitrary I extend this concept to a continuum of
aspiration levels and show that the second criterion of rational choice
requires minimising the probability of not achieving the aspiration
level for all possible choices of aspiration level simultaneously, where
the importance of reaching each particular level of utility is expressed
through a weighting function. By assuming the decomposition of a
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rational preference ordering into a component embodying only PR,
and one which is PR neutral we may employ PR neutral utilities
uN as the substrate for the theory. Final utilities in this view
are obtained from PR neutral utilities by the application of the
Aspiration Weighting Function
U =
Z
®
³
uN
´
dF
³
uN
´
I have further shown that this criterion can also be derived by
applying the axioms of SEU to lotteries of PR-neutral utility values
if PR preferences are rational. Given a preference structure which
obeys the axioms required to derive SEU over lotteries where the
outcomes are fully expressed in utility values, we may derive the
criterion of PR minimisation.
In addition, the assumption that the probability of not achieving
each aspiration level decreases in importance as the level increases
implies that second order stochastic dominance must be satis…ed by
the preference structure over the lotteries. This allows us to further
stipulate that the Aspiration Weighting Function, ® (u). must be
concave and nondecreasing. The further assumption that the risk of
a prospect must increase if a constant positive value is added to each
outcome leads us to an exponential shape for this function.
Thus, PR may be supported by both an axiomatic derivation
and the generalisation of an intuitive psychological notion of risk.
Furthermore the notion of risk embodied in this criterion may be
applied to choices where utility cannot be attributed entirely by
transforming monetary outcomes through a value function, and thus
promises far greater universality then previous notions of risk.
There are many potential ways the complete theory might be
practically applied to economic and …nancial problems. Speci…cally,
PRT o¤ers the potential to investigate individual’s risk attitude
separately to their attitudes to value and probability. In an
institutional context the theory allows an entity to have linear
reactions to value (thus displaying no diminishing marginal returns
to money, an assumption often thought to be irrational for corporate
entities) whilst still having a rational measure of risk aversion.
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The theory also allows a normative risk/return trade-o¤ without
requiring the restrictive assumptions on the utility function or
returns distributions that are required for rational mean-variance
analysis. Indeed, PRT o¤ers the foundations for risk-adjusted
…nancial performance measurement whilst maintaining an entirely
linear utility function.
The inescapable implication of PRT is that the edi…ce of economic
theory is based on a misspeci…ed notion of rationality that ignores a
fundamental component of the choice environment. That this is so
has become increasingly obvious in recent years as greater complexity
of descriptive modelling has failed to provide a good description
of human choice, or to resolve convincingly outstanding paradoxes
and problems. PR may be adapted to …t into any extant rational
theory of choice, and I develop PR Prospect Theory in this paper
and demonstrate that much of the work that has been performed by
descriptive patches to EUT in the past may now have a normative
explanation in terms of PR. There remains much empirical and
theoretical work to develop and test this theory but, if true it implies
some interesting amendments to the existing structure of …nance
theory.
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Figure 1: The standard value functions leave two potential gaps between the
consequences and the utility allocations required by EUT
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Figure 2: The overall preference ordering º is decomposed into a component that
re‡ects only Pure Risk attitude ºPR and one which re‡ects all non-PR aspects of
the decision maker and which is neutral with respect to Pure Risk, ºN .
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Figure 3: Gaps in utility allocations after the inclusion of Pure Risk Theory.
70
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
CPT Value Function Pure Risk Utility
CPT function 
• equal curvature for 
gains and losses
• no loss aversion
Pure Risk and CPT
• losses more linear 
than gains
• displays loss 
aversion
Figure 4: Transformations of monetary gains and losses for CPT and PRPT
(dotted line). CPT is exponential and restricted to two parameters and thus does
not display loss aversion (¸ = 1) or di¤erential values of gain and loss curvature
(g = l = 0:5). The Aspiration Weighting Function is governed by ½ = 1.
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